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1Introduction
Th e West African region, as an entity comprising African, Caribbean and Paciﬁ c (ACP) and World 
Trade Organization (WTO) countries, is engaged in two principal negotiation processes, one of them 
multilateral, at the WTO, and the other within the framework of Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with the European Union (EU) concerning four regional groupings in Africa.
Th e Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the EU and the ACP countries expected to succeed 
the Lomé Agreement, envisages the signing of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) by December 
2007.  Th e EPAs will be the new cooperative framework under the CPA and are expected to adopt 
an integrated approach based on partnership and promoting cooperation, trade and political dialogue 
between the EU and ACP countries.  One of the essential characteristics of this multilateral partnership 
is that it hopes to combine trade (to respond to the challenge of globalization), development assistance 
(essential to ACP countries) and a strengthened political dimension.  Th e key CPA principles are 
reciprocity; diﬀ erentiation; deeper regional integration; and coordination of trade and aid.
Th e EPAs will address trade barriers, supply-side constraints in ACP countries, and the question of 
compatibility to WTO rules.  EPAs are aimed at putting in place free trade area (FTA) arrangements 
to replace the non-reciprocal trading preferences currently advanced to the ACP countries by EU in 
compliance to the Lomé Conventions.
Th is report sets out to assess the economic impact of the trade component of the EPA between West 
African countries and the EU.  To that end, we will adopt two complementary methodologies: one in 
general equilibrium and the other in partial equilibrium.  Th e combination of these two approaches is 
due to the fact that general equilibrium analysis does not incorporate the impacts at the country level.
Analysis of trade policies presupposes the study of the implications of these instruments on the productive 
structure of the economies at the national and international levels.  Th ese instruments have direct and 
indirect eﬀ ects on the relative prices of the goods produced in diﬀ erent sectors of a given country.  Owing 
to the various sectoral interactions, general-equilibrium models need to be used in order to explore the 
economic consequences of modifying trade policy instruments, such as the consequences engendered by 
a partnership agreement of this nature.
However, most African countries are individually absent from the databases associated with this kind 
of model.  Only a limited number are individually present, while the majority form part of aggregate 
groupings, as is the case with Economic Community of West African States  (ECOWAS).  Th e World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS/SMART) model therefore makes it possible to capture the general-
equilibrium analysis which uses a database excluding national speciﬁ cities.  
2Th e EPA negotiating framework, in our view, oﬀ ers a number of liberalization options and three scenarios 
will be examined in a general-equilibrium framework.
Th e ﬁ rst assesses the implications of an EPA within a context where sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) applies 
the same preferential regime to the EU as that from which it currently beneﬁ ts from the latter (full 
reciprocity). 
Alongside the reciprocity principle, the CPA advocates for deepened integration between the ACP 
countries.
In the second scenario, we assess the impact for sub-Saharan Africa of deepened regional integration 
without immediate reciprocity to EU preferences.  Th is scenario is explained by the fact that most African 
countries have not been able to utilize the preferences ﬂ owing from the Lomé Conventions owing to 
supply-side constraints.  Th e scenario therefore presents an option whereby sub-Saharan African countries 
liberalize trade between them without immediate reciprocity to the EU, such that they are then able to 
compete with EU producers and exporters.
In the third scenario, we explore the option of a free trade area (FTA) arrangement by sub-Saharan 
Africa to the EU.  In this scenario, all barriers to bilateral trade between sub-Saharan Africa and the 
EU (protocols on goods, non-tariﬀ  barriers, etc.) are eliminated.  Indeed, even if African countries have 
preferential access to the EU market, there are still a number of signiﬁ cant barriers to African exports.
Th e results of the simulations show that the ﬁ rst scenario is clearly unfavourable to sub-Saharan Africa. 
While the deepened regional integration and the FTA scenarios have positive eﬀ ects on sub-Saharan 
Africa, both in terms of GDP and welfare, it is the establishment of an FTA which would potentially 
most beneﬁ t sub-Saharan Africa.  Th is result is explained by improved market access for African exports 
as a result of the elimination of customs tariﬀ s, particularly on highly protected agricultural products and 
labour-intensive industrial products.
However, the tools employed in assessing the diﬀ erent scenarios do not really take into account the 
adjustment costs linked to this kind of liberalization.  Th ese costs are all the more important because the 
liberalization is ambitious, in that they are linked to reallocations of factors freed up by liberalization.  It 
is the third scenario that would bring about the highest adjustment costs.
In order to gauge the magnitude of the variations in the main aggregates of total trade liberalization in 
each of the ECOWAS countries, we will simulate, in a partial equilibrium, the removal of duties applied 
by these countries on imports from the EU.  Th is simulation will make it possible to gauge the magnitude 
of the adjustments that ECOWAS countries will be faced with in the event of the dismantling of their 
trade barriers.
3Th e present study consists of eight sections.  After the introduction, we present in the ﬁ rst section, the 
proﬁ le of the ACP-EU cooperation agreements from Lomé to Cotonou.  We also show how a certain 
“grey areas” in the WTO rules on regional agreements can enable African countries to beneﬁ t more 
from the EPAs by taking advantage of greater ﬂ exibility.  Th e next section presents some graphical data 
on Africa’s trade ﬂ ows in general and on trade ﬂ ows of ECOWAS in particular.  Th e third section deals 
with the analytical framework in general equilibrium.  It contains a presentation of the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) model used for assessing the impact of diﬀ erent partnership agreement options. 
In the fourth section, we focus on the characteristics of African economies, which are drawn from the 
GTAP database and which play a key role in the operative interactions in this kind of liberalization.  Th e 
ﬁ fth section deals with the analytical framework in partial equilibrium which is complementary to the 
general-equilibrium modelling.  Th e assessments of the economic impacts of the EPAs for Africa, using 
the general-equilibrium model, are analysed in the sixth section, while those particularly concerning the 
ECOWAS countries, using the partial-equilibrium framework, are presented in the penultimate section. 
Finally, the last section comprises concluding remarks.
4I.  From Lomé to Cotonou   
Th e cooperation arrangement between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa are by no means recent.  Th ey 
go back to the period just after independence, when Europe sought to strengthen its relations with the 
former colonies and to bolster their development process.  Th e cooperation entered a signiﬁ cant phase 
during the early 1970s when Europe endeavoured to put in place an innovative cooperation framework 
through the Lomé conventions.  Th ese agreements then represented a signiﬁ cant innovation in the context 
of international cooperation, particularly in terms of the support given to the process of diversiﬁ cation of 
Africa’s economies and the eﬀ orts to stabilize the prices of primary commodities1.
However, Lomé was not able to achieve the objectives set, and Africa remained strongly dependent on 
primary commodities.  Furthermore, Africa’s share of European trade diminished.  Th e limited results 
were at the root of a reworking of the conventions and the introduction of the reciprocity principle in the 
Cotonou Convention.  Th e reciprocity principle was strengthened in the negotiated EPAs.
Th ese developments represent a signiﬁ cant innovation in the spirit and the innovative principles 
incorporated from the early 1970s in the EU-SSA cooperation frameworks.
Th is section sets out to highlight some of the dimensions of the EU-SSA cooperation proﬁ le over time.
1.1  Th e Lomé Conventions: a brief overview
Observers agree that the Lomé Conventions represented an innovative model and an example to follow 
in the context of a North-South cooperation. Indeed, by laying an emphasis on the need for the countries 
of the South to develop autonomously and by enabling the ACP countries to formulate their own 
developmental choices, these agreements broke with a tradition that merely reproduced the colonial 
relationships and formed the basis of a new development cooperation paradigm.
A cursory overview of these agreements reveals considerable deviation between their content and the 
practice.
Th e Lomé Conventions concluded in 1975 between the ACP countries and the EU were characterized 
by their innovativeness. Placing at the forefront the freedom of the contracting States to formulate 
their development policies and choices, these agreements recognized the right of the ACP countries to 
formulate autonomous development models.  It would appear that a combination of two factors resulted 
in that content.
1 H.Ben Hammouda, Africa: Towards a New Development Contract, Editions 1’Harmattan, 2000.
5First, there was the context of the time, characterized as it was by an upsurge in “Th ird World” demands 
for a new international economic order.  Th e 1970s witnessed the emergence of a formidable sense 
of solidarity among developing countries, who were demanding the reform of the mechanisms and 
institutions governing the inner workings of the world economy, towards greater equity and equality. 
Th is upsurge of the “Th ird World” over that period was a factor that could not be overlooked.
Th e second factor was the formidable unity demonstrated by the ACP countries during the negotiations. 
Th ese countries managed to maintain a cohesion and convergence of interests in the dealings with the 
EU, despite their considerable diversity. Th is factor was broadly noted by commentators at the time.  Th e 
Times article covering the negotiations, for example, was entitled, “Africans agree united approach to 
EEC”2, and P.Lemaître, the Le Monde correspondent at the negotiations, noted that “the myth of unity, 
African unity which was unassailable, but also unity of the ACP group of countries which, despite their 
geographical heterogeneity, had become very real, and ﬁ nally won the day over the usages of expression 
and behaviour that had separate associates and associables at the outset”.  Finally, Claude Cheysson, in his 
presentation to the Economic and Social Council of the Communities, underscored this upsurge of ACP 
solidarity when he stated: “… I can tell you that they remained united to the end, under quite formidable 
circumstances”3.  Th us, by dint of this remarkable solidarity, the ACP countries were able to bestow on 
the Lomé Conventions an innovative and original pro-development content.  Th is content is manifested 
in the pertinent principles and agreements.
1.2  Th e principles: an innovating platform
From the outset in the international negotiations, the ACP advocated a common platform 
comprising seven points that summed up their perspectives on economic cooperation with 
the EU in the spheres of trade, industry and fi nance.  The EU, for its part, formulated a point-
by-point response to the ACP proposals in a memorandum.  At the close of negotiations 
lasting 18 months, the two partners arrived at a common ground and were able to formulate 
an agreed platform which constitute the overall framework of the Lomé Conventions.  This 
platform comprises a number of new principles in North-South multilateral cooperation.  It 
refers to:
• Th e right of each State to determine its political, social, cultural and economic choices;
• Th e need for ACP countries to develop self-focused development policies;
• Agricultural development to ensure food self-suﬃ  ciency;
2  P. Bouvier, l’Europe et la cooperation au développement; un bilan, la convention de Lomé, University of Brussels Press, 1980, p.39.
3 P. Bouvier, op.cit., p.39.
6• Industrialization, which would have to play a key role in development policies; 
• Th e need to diversify production in these economies and to depart from excessive specialization, and 
• Developing cooperation and trade between them
Th ese principles, taken together, made the Lomé Conventions the example of the new cooperation relations 
between North and South.  However, the innovative nature of the Lomé Conventions go beyond the platform 
established, but also relate to the mechanisms which have been put in place under the agreements.
1.3  Th e mechanisms: new areas of cooperation
Over and above the declaration of a set of general principles, the Lomé Conventions also deﬁ ne new 
areas of cooperation.  We will consider, in turn, industrial cooperation, the STABEX system, and trade 
cooperation.
1.4  Industrial cooperation
Th e Lomé Conventions are distinguishable from the Yaoundé Conventions in that the former confer 
centrality to the sphere of industrialization which consequently becomes the key objective of the Lomé 
Conventions, agriculture had a key role in the Yaoundé Conventions.  Th e new attention given to 
industrialization is reﬂ ected in the wording, where in the preamble itself, the contracting States aﬃ  rm their 
determination to promote industrial development in the ACP countries through expanded cooperation 
actions between these countries and the member States.
In the ﬁ nancial sphere, even though the Lomé Conventions did not envisage new ﬁ nancial arrangements 
for industry, they expanded the scope of the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) – the ﬁ nancial instruments of the system – so as to enable them to intervene 
in industrial development projects4.   To that end, they have eﬀ ected a division of labour: the EDF is 
concerned with infrastructure development while the EIB intervenes in the establishment or expansion 
of industrial enterprises.  Th e Conventions also provided for mobilization of private and public capital to 
ﬁ nance energy research, exploration and development projects.
To foster industrial cooperation, the Lomé Conventions put in place two institutions, namely, the 
Industrial Development Committee and the Industrial Development Centre.  Th e Committee is charged 
with fostering industrial cooperation and monitoring the activities of the Centre.  Th e Centre is a body 
charged with a number of functions, including information dissemination and organizing contacts 
between business entities and industrial policy oﬃ  cials in the EU and ACP countries, conducting feasibility 
studies to accelerate the creation of industrial enterprises in the ACP countries, identifying and utilizing 
opportunities for joint ventures and for subcontracting, and seeking possible sources of ﬁ nancing.
4 M.P. Roy, la CEE et le Tiers-Monde: les conventions de Lomé, Notes et Etudes documentaires.  La documentation française, No. 4795, 1985. 
7Th us, both the ﬁ nancial arrangements and agreements and the institutions established show that the 
Lomé Conventions paid particular attention to industrial development in the ACP countries.  From 
that point of departure, the industrial development initiated by the conventions can be examined, in 
order to establish, in particular, whether it has enabled these countries to fundamentally transform their 
production structured towards diversiﬁ cation.
1.5 Th e STABEX system
During the negotiations under the Lomé Conventions, the question of stabilization of commodity export 
revenues from agricultural and minerals emerged as the main area of concern for the ACP countries.  It 
was essential for these countries to ensure the stability of those revenues, which constitute their main 
source of development ﬁ nancing.
Th e Lomé Agreements introduced the STABEX system, the objective of which was to remedy the adverse 
eﬀ ects of unstable export revenues and to try to guarantee stable revenues on exports from the ACP 
countries to the EU and other destinations of commodities on which their economies depend, which are 
aﬀ ected by ﬂ uctuations in price, quantity or both.
STABEX, which dealt with export revenues relating to 49 agricultural commodities, had two 
thresholds:
• A threshold of dependency on the commodity in question vis-à-vis the total exports of the economy, 
initially set at 7.5 per cent and subsequently scaled down to 6 per cent, which constitutes the ﬁ rst 
condition of applicability of STABEX;
• A threshold of release, the second condition of applicability of STABEX, initially set at 7.5 per cent 
and also subsequently scaled down to 6 per cent.  If the export revenues of an ACP fall by more than 
6 per cent by reference to the four preceding years, the EEC would set in motion a compensatory 
transfer in the form of a loan (a grant in the case of the LDCs) to be repaid when the reverse situation 
materializes.
Th e stabilization mechanism for export revenues was reinforced by the establishment, under Lomé II, of 
a system known as SYSMIN which fulﬁ ls the same role in respect of mineral commodities as STABEX 
does for agricultural commodities.
Even though the operation of these stabilization mechanisms for export revenues has attracted a measure 
of criticism, they have been seen by developing countries as a gain that has enabled them to stem the tide 
of price ﬂ uctuations and to be able to count on fairly stable foreign exchange inﬂ ows.
81.6  Trade cooperation
In terms of trade cooperation, the main innovation of the Lomé Conventions by reference to the Yaoundé 
Conventions was the departure from the reciprocity principle on trade preferences.  Th e Yaoundé 
Conventions had allowed exemptions on customs duties and taxes and dismantled all quantitative 
barriers to the movement of merchandize between African countries and the EU.  However, the Lomé 
Conventions removed this clause under pressure from the ACP countries, so that the right of free 
admission was no longer recognized for European exports to ACP countries.  Th e abandonment of these 
principles has attracted a measure of criticism, from both developed countries and developing countries 
that were not part of the Conventions.  Th e developed countries, and in particular, Japan and the United 
States of America5, levelled criticism at the agreements in the international forums, seeing them as being 
incompatible with the ground rules of international trade.  On their part, the non-beneﬁ ciary developing 
countries, for fear of losing out on the disparate treatment resulting from the Lomé Conventions, took 
exception to the departure from the reciprocity principle for only one set of countries and demanded 
that the same should be extended to “Th ird World” countries as a whole. However, the hopes placed in 
the Conventions have waned, and there is a considerable gap between the principles embodied in the 
Conventions and their actual application.
1.7  Th e outcome of the Conventions
We will examine, in turn, the operation of STABEX and cooperation in the spheres of trade, industry 
and ﬁ nance.
1.8  Industrial cooperation
Th e question under consideration here is whether the Lomé Conventions have helped the ACP countries 
set in motion a process of industrialization that has helped diversify the production base.
At the same time, it should be underscored that since independence, some African countries embarked on 
a major eﬀ ort to diversify their industrial structures in order to depart from the dominance of agro-based 
export commodities.  Th ese countries integrated import-substitution strategies through the introduction 
of industrial activities aimed at meeting the basic needs of their people.  However, these experiments soon 
came to a dead end owing to the narrowness of domestic markets in most of the continent’s economies.  In 
addition, technological and ﬁ nancial dependence limited their room for manoeuvre.  During the 1980s, 
structural adjustments and the closure of many industrial plants in African countries put a damper on 
the industrial modernization eﬀ orts.  It is true that the responsibility for Africa’s industrial development 
does not rest with the Lomé Conventions.  However, it must be underscored that the Conventions have 
5 M.P.Roy, op.cit.
9not boosted the development of the continent and the formation of coherent and competitive industrial 
structures.
1.9  Th e STABEX mechanisms
Th e main shortcoming of the STABEX mechanism was the inadequacy of ﬁ nancial resources available for 
responding to falling prices.  Th e system worked well initially, but was shaken by falling prices starting 
from the early 1980s.  Th is was manifested in a wide deﬁ cit within the STABEX system, and by a decrease 
in the rate of coverage for the drop in export revenues.  In 1980, nearly 53 per cent could be covered from 
available resources, but this rate stood at only 24.7 per cent by 19816.  
Th is trend vindicates the presentiment of A. Emmanuel7, who had stated, way back in 1976, that the 
STABEX objectives were not apt to check the drop in commodity prices, but to spread out their impacts 
over time.  Th is perception was founded on the fact that the reference period was ﬂ uid, in that today’s 
revenues become the norm tomorrow: consequently, the drop in revenues is merely deferred and the price 
trend in the long term is not really taken into account under STABEX.  In general terms, STABEX views 
the commodity prices to be stabilized as being normal.  It does not take into consideration changes in 
value of these prices and addresses even less the whole issue of price formation in developing countries 
by reference to development.
It has become increasingly clear that this question is central to the management of growth phenomena 
in the developing countries, and that it is necessary for them, in the context of development, to put 
commodity price stabilization schemes into place. In sum, STABEX has not allowed for an eﬀ ective 
stabilization of the price system.
1.10  Trade cooperation
Th e provisions of the Lomé Conventions pertaining to trade cooperation have not had much impact 
on trade ﬂ ows in the ACP countries.  Th is limited impact is noticeable in four respects.  First, in the 
dimension of trade between the ACP countries and the rest of the world: the share of the ACP countries in 
world trade remains marginal and was in fact on a downward trend during the period from the mid-1970s 
to the early 1980s.  Th is proportion decreased from 3.5 per cent in 1970 to 2.8 per cent in 1981 8.
Secondly, the share of ACP countries in developing-country trade diminished signiﬁ cantly during the 
1970s.  Th eir exports decreased from 18 per cent of developing-country exports as a whole to 9 per 
6 S.Pré, op.cit.
7 A. Emmanuel, La stabilization, alibi de l’exploitation internationale, Th ird World Review, vol. XVII, April-June 1976.
8 M.P. Roy, op.cit.
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cent over the period 1970-19819.  Imports exhibited the same downward trend in comparison with 
developing-country imports as a whole: the share of imports into ACP country imports fell from 16 per 
cent in 1970 to 9 per cent by 198110.
Th e share of the ACP in EEC trade also diminished.  Even though the value of this trade increased, there 
was a net fall with regard to their share in the EU’s international trade as a whole.  Th e value of EU imports 
from the ACP countries had increased from $US 4.7 billion in 1970 to nearly $US 27 billion in 1980, 
which represents an annual rate of growth of 20 per cent, but over the same period, their share in total 
imports from the EU decreased from 7.8 per cent to 7.1 per cent.  Exports from the EU countries into the 
ACP countries increased in value from $US 3.5 billion to $US 22 billion over the period 1970-1980, but 
the share of these exports in total exports from the EU decreased from 7.2 per cent to 6.3 per cent.
Finally, to take the composition of EU-ACP trade by commodity mix, it emerges that exports from the 
ACP countries consisted largely of a set of primary commodities: the share of primary commodities in 
exports stabilized around 95 per cent whilst the share of industrial commodities varied only slightly, from 
2.3 per cent in 1975 to 3.6 per cent in 198011.
In sum, it is clear that the Lomé Conventions, and in particular, the arrangements relating to trade 
cooperation, have had little impact on the trade relations with ACP countries, which have not been 
able to avoid the deterioration of their share in the trade ﬂ ows, nor the persistence of agro-based exports 
in their trade structures.  Consequently, the various arrangements have not enabled the ACP countries 
to reverse the trend of specialization in agro-based exports in the international economic arena, and 
continue to play the role of suppliers of primary commodities to Europe.
1.11  Financial cooperation
Th e arrangements under the Lomé Conventions relating to ﬁ nancial cooperation have not prevented heavy 
indebtedness on the part of the ACP countries.  Indeed, the drop in the prices of primary commodities 
which began during the late 1970s was manifested, for the ACP countries, in a massive recourse to 
international debt.  From around 1984, the ACP countries were faced with a debt crisis: their arrears 
reached $US 12 billion in 1986 and was increasing at a rate of $US 4 billion annually.
Th e EEC subsequently focused on Africa’s debt crisis. Starting from 1987, it formulated a special 
programme on debt within the framework of the Lomé Conventions, which was designed to supplement 
the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the IMF and the World Bank, and was aimed at 
9 M.P. Roy, op.cit.
10 M.P. Roy, op.cit.
11M.P. Roy, op.cit.
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providing export assistance to the ACP countries12.  Under this programme, the EEC distinguished two 
categories of countries:
• Th ose that had applied SAPs, supported by the World Bank and the IMF.  In this case, EEC 
intervention was incorporated into these programmes and pursues the same objectives through the 
formulation of overarching programmes or programmes speciﬁ cally focused on import assistance;
• Th ose that had not applied the SAPs.  Th e EEC would then urge these countries to adhere to them 
in order to be able to beneﬁ t from import assistance from the EU.
Th us, within the context of the debt crisis of the ACP countries, an element of complementarity on the 
ground is observable between the IMF and the EEC.
Th is trend was buttressed by the signing of Lomé IV in December 1989, under which the EEC imposed 
the conditionality of structural adjustment for the provision of assistance to ACP countries.  Th ese new 
arrangements gave rise to opposition and criticism in some quarters, and in particular, those by Edgar 
Pisani, Commissioner for Cooperation and Development during the negotiations under the third Lomé 
Conventions, who stated that Lomé would no longer be Lomé if there was to be a commitment along 
the path of adjustments, and that Lomé was a pro-development instrument.
Consequently, the track record of the Lomé Conventions is fairly modest.  First, a wide gap is observable 
between the stated principles and the practical dimension of these arrangements.  Additionally, despite 
the arrangements, the ﬁ nancial aid and the industrial-development support ﬂ owing from them, African 
countries have not been able to put in place a robust and competitive growth impetus.
1.12  New proposals for EU/ACP cooperation
Th e failure of the Lomé Conventions led to a broad review of these arrangements and to an attempt to 
develop a new cooperation model between Europe and African countries.
Th e new proposals and the options of the European Commission are contained in a “Green Paper” 
published in 1997.13Th is “Green Paper” starts by recalling the context in which the new round of 
negotiations will operate – i.e. the emergence of the internal market and the adoption of a single currency, 
which make it necessary for Europe to embark on a major institutional review.  Th e Commission goes 
on to state “that the development of the internal market and the prospect of the adoption of a single 
currency, review of the Treaty and other institutional reforms under discussion within the framework of 
the Intergovernmental Conference, formulation of a new ﬁ nancial order in the medium term, and the 
12 FRESEA, Ajustement structurel de la CEE sur le FMI, September 1988.
13   COM (96) 570 ﬁ nal of 20 November 1996 “Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of 
the 21st century; challenges and options for a new partnership”.
12
prospect of enlargement to the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, to the Baltic States, 
to Cyprus and Malta, constitute so many milestones in the coming years, and prepare Europe to face the 
challenges of the 21st century”.
In this context, Europe sought to embark on a debate on the future of the Lomé Conventions while 
taking into consideration two important questions. Th e ﬁ rst was the phenomenon of globalization 
and the need to ﬁ t cooperation arrangements into new realities. Th e Commission stressed that a new 
economic plan, the extension of the market economy and the end of exclusive or privileged relations 
have modiﬁ ed the conditions of supply and demand in the global markets.  Th e conclusion of trade 
negotiations under the Uruguay Round created a new multilateral context, accelerating the process of 
globalization of the economy brought about by technological developments and by the liberalization 
of economic policies commencing in the 1980s. Interdependence was also perceived to be growing and 
expanding beyond the economic and ﬁ nancial spheres, into the social and environmental spheres. 14In 
this view, Europe sought to integrate the new Convention into the framework of globalization.  Th e 
Commission moreover asserted that at the dawn of the 21st century, a thoroughgoing reﬂ ection was called 
for on the future orientation of the relations between the European Union and the ACP countries.  Th e 
closeness of the expiry of the current Convention in February 2000, the contractual obligation to embark 
on negotiations between the two parties at least 18 months before that date, as well as the need to deﬁ ne, 
within the context of the strengthened disciplines of the WTO, a trade cooperation framework wholly in 
conformity with the new multilateral rules, provided a unique opportunity for EU and ACP countries to 
embark on a broad debate on the future of relations between them.15
Th e EU sought to redeﬁ ne its relationship with developing countries and stated that: “Th ese new policies 
are the Union’s response to the political and economic changes under way on the international scene 
and reﬂ ect the fact that the Union’s external relations are not only global in scope but tailored to speciﬁ c 
circumstances”16 In addition therefore to normalizing its relationship with ACP countries, the EU embarked 
on initiatives with other developing countries in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and Latin America.
On this basis, Europe embarked on two main objectives for a new EU/ACP Convention.  Th e ﬁ rst related 
to increasing the eﬀ ectiveness of aid in the light of the criticisms that have been levelled in recent years at 
the track record of the ACP Agreements. Indeed, the Commission pointed out in its Green Paper that “in 
view of the patchy achievements of ACP-EU cooperation and a degree of scepticism about the scope for 
developing the ACP countries against the background of tight budgets and an inward looking tendency 
borne of social diﬃ  culties in Europe, partners on both sides are now seeking to place more emphasis on 
the eﬀ ectiveness of cooperation and to review their priorities with an eye to reﬂ ecting better the concerns 
14 European Commission, op.cit, p.I.
15 European Commission, op.cit., p.II.
16 European Commission, op.cit. p.I
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of European and ACP societies”.17 In parallel with increasing the eﬀ ectiveness of aid, the Commission 
underscored the greater diﬀ erentiation of the ACP countries which calls for speciﬁ c treatment and an 
enhanced adaptability of Europe’s cooperation strategies with the ACP countries.
Consequently, cooperation agreements that made aid more eﬀ ective and more relevant to developing 
countries required, in the Commission’s view, the development of a market economy and greater 
integration of the ACP countries into global processes. Th e Commission Green Paper stresses the fact 
that “in a rapidly changing global and regional environment, the ACP countries have to face up to many 
challenges: halting their economic marginalization and integrating into international trade, implementing 
the domestic, political and social changes needed to build a democratic society and a market economy, 
and creating the conditions for sustainable development and poverty alleviation in a context of still high 
population growth”.18
Europe therefore appeared to be set on the path of a new framework for its cooperation relationship with 
sub-Saharan African countries.  In this context, it envisaged four scenarios in its future relationship with 
the ACP countries:
• Th e ﬁ rst scenario was the status quo, under which the overall agreement between the EU and the 
ACP countries was maintained, but with minor adjustments;
• In the second scenario, diﬀ erentiation between the ACP countries would be taken a step further, 
while at the same time the overall agreement would be supplemented by more speciﬁ c bilateral 
agreements;
• Th e third scenario consisted of splitting up the EU/ACP Convention into regional agreements.  In 
this view, the agreement between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa would also embrace South Africa. 
However, the agreements with the Caribbean and Paciﬁ c countries would be integrated into an 
enlarged cooperation framework between Europe, Latin America and Asia; and 
• Th e fourth scenario would comprise a speciﬁ c agreement for the least developed countries of the 
ACP and possibly open to other LDCs.
Th ese general proposals embodied Europe’s determination to normalize its relationship with the ACP 
countries and to weave this into the overall framework of economic liberalization and integration into 
the globalization process.  Th e existence of a formal agreement had hitherto resulted in Europe eﬀ ecting 
speciﬁ c treatment to ACP countries in order to help them build competitive growth dynamics.  Th rough 
the review of the Lomé Conventions, Europe’s objective is to unify its policy vis-à-vis the developing 
countries and to integrate the ACP countries into the same reciprocal approach as its other partners.
Th e shift in the cooperation perspectives is embodied in the trade proposals formulated by Europe vis-
à-vis the ACP countries.  Th e Commission notes that the ACP countries have not been able to beneﬁ t 
17 European Commission, op.cit.p.III
18 European Commission, op.cit. p.IV
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from the non-reciprocal preferences granted them by Europe.  It points out that “ACP exports to the 
EU have been no exception to those countries’ generally poor trade performance and their share of the 
EU market has declined appreciably dropping from 6.7 per cent in 1976 to 2.8 per cent in 1994”19. 
Th ere are accordingly various EU options relating to external economic cooperation with the ACP 
countries:
• Th e ﬁ rst option consists in maintaining the status quo with the present system of diﬀ erentiated but 
non-reciprocal preferences;
• Th e second option relates to the application of the Community’s generalized scheme of preferences 
(GSP) on a bilateral or multilateral basis;
• Th e third option reposes in the application of uniform reciprocity with the freeing- up, after a 
transitional period, of the markets of the ACP countries to EU products.  Th is option, the 
Commission points out, would be the one most in line with WTO Rounds; and 
• Th e fourth option consists in the application of diﬀ erentiated reciprocity between the EU and 
diﬀ erent groups of countries or between the EU and individual countries.
Th us, the EU proposals – with the exception of the ﬁ rst one, which is by no means preferred by European 
experts – are inclined towards the elimination of non-reciprocal preferences applied by the EU to ACP 
countries.  Th ese trade agreements were suﬃ  ciently ingrained into the EU orientations during the 1970s 
to impart a new content into its cooperation relations with African countries.  At present, however, the 
Commission seems to be treating free trade and respect for WTO rules as the framework for its new 
cooperation relationship with the ACP countries.
Th is perspective embraces capita movements to the extent that the Commission has sought to integrate 
them into new agreements on the protection of foreign investment.  Th us, the Commission states in 
its Green Paper that “international agreements are being negotiated and the Commission is pushing 
for progress in the WTO context.  Negotiations are also under way in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) with a view to a Multilateral Agreement on Investment”20.  It is 
well known, however, that the Multilateral Agreement on Investment has not made much headway.
Consequently, the patchy achievements of the Lomé Conventions led Europe to propose a major renewal of 
these arrangements. Th e EU cited the ineﬀ ectiveness of the conventions and the increasing diﬀ erentiation 
between countries as the basis for proposing the discontinuation of non-reciprocal treatment and for a 
reworking of EU-ACP cooperation to reﬂ ect the realities of globalization. Th is integration, and greater 
trade liberalization, would allow for better allocation of resources in the ACP countries and improved 
eﬀ ectiveness of European cooperation and aid.
Th e EU perspective on the status of the Lomé Conventions is not shared by ACP countries.  In regard 
19 European Commission, op.cit., p.IX
20 European Commission, op.cit., p. IX
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to aid eﬀ ectiveness, experts hold the view that the Lomé trade protocols have enabled some countries 
to improve their economic performance.  Carl Greenidge, Deputy Secretary – General of the ACP 
Group, observes: “it cannot be denied that the ACP share of the European market has declined.  But 
the trouble is that very often, the analysis stops there, which I think is unsatisfactory.  If you look more 
carefully, you get a diﬀ erent picture.  Certain countries notably those that have special access via the 
protocols like Mauritius, Jamaica and Côte d’Ivoire, have done well”21.  Moreover, African experts lay 
emphasis on the fall in prices of export commodities from ACP countries to underscore the limitations 
of these initiatives.  It is estimated that between 1980 and 1992, losses from the collapse in commodity 
prices of exports from developing countries were equivalent to about twice the volume of EU aid going 
to these countries.
On the issue of the growing divergences within the ACP Group, experts from the ACP countries stress 
that the present Convention has always taken account of the diversity between countries.  C. Greenidge 
observes that the Convention as it stands is a multi-faceted tool which allows for diﬀ erentiation by sector, 
country or region22.
Th e main issue, however, remains that of maintenance of preferential treatment for ACP countries. 
Th e EU proposals are geared towards free trade aimed at opening up the borders of ACP countries. 
However, this perspective attracts a number of criticisms related to the fact that the productivity 
diﬀ erential between African economies and the EU area, is such that liberalization would jeopardize the 
continent’s manufacturing sector “How can you say you are going to have a poverty-focused cooperation 
programme”, C. Greenridge asks, “and, at the same time, destroy the trade regime which is a lifeline for 
many of the countries in question?”23.
Th e ACP countries too, have raised policy issues pertaining to the deliberations on renewing the Lomé 
Conventions.  Th e ﬁ rst question relates to splitting up of the Conventions in to regional agreements. 
Such splitting up would, in the view of experts from ACP countries, result in a weakening of these 
countries vis-à-vis Europe and further marginalize their vital interests in negotiations.  In this regard, C. 
Greenidge points out: “from my own experience as a negotiator on the ACP side … I believe that the 
current structure and size of the Group has assisted it in negotiating with the EU.  I would be surprised 
if the ACP Group were to ﬁ nd negotiations in smaller groups more eﬀ ective.  In negotiations, the Group 
provides a countervailing power, if you like, to Europe”24.
Clearly, these proposals, apart from their openness, are underpinned by a fundamental perspective, which 
is to consider that the impediments and drawbacks to growth are linked to a formidable interventionism in 
internal economic systems and in international economic relations.  In this context, internal liberalization 
21 Th e Courier, Africa, Caribbean, Paciﬁ c, European Union, No. 162, April-March 1997, p.19
22 Th e Courier, op.cit., p.20.
23 Th e Courier, op.cit., p.20
24 Th e Courier, op.cit., p.20
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can, just like international integration processes, revamp supply and streamline integration at the global 
level.  It was the intention of the Commission, as far back as 1997, to weave these cooperation agreements 
with the ACP countries into that perspective.  
1.13  Th e Cotonou Cooperation Agreement
At the end of two years of negotiations between the ACP countries and the EU, a new agreement known 
as the Cotonou Agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin, in June 2000.
Th e Cotonou Agreement, which entered into force on 1 April 2003, was aimed at re-establishing 
macroeconomic equilibria, developing the private sector, improving social services, promoting regional 
integration, promoting equality of opportunity between men and women, protecting the environment 
and gradually and reciprocally eliminating trade barriers.  Th e Cotonou Agreement will run for a period 
of 20 years, with possible revisions every ﬁ ve years.  It rests on ﬁ ve interdependent pillars:
• A comprehensive political dimension consisting in an enhanced dialogue, and a special focus on 
conﬂ ict prevention and resolution, as well as on governance issues and the respect of human rights 
and the rule of law;
• A set of participatory approaches, including greater emphasis on the role of civil society;
• A focus on poverty reduction, and a central role for the private sector and regional integration in 
development strategies;
• A new framework for trade and economic cooperation in conformity with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) arrangements in order to integrate the ACP countries into the global economy, 
and put regional integration at the forefront of priorities; and 
• A reform of ﬁ nancial cooperation aimed at ensuring, in particular, simpliﬁ cation, coherence, 
enhanced ﬂ exibility and continued adaptability of aid to the speciﬁ c conditions of each country.
As far as trade is concerned, the Cotonou Agreement does not really detail the provisions for the future. 
It does however oﬀ er the pursuit of Lomé non-reciprocal trade arrangements until 2008 at the latest, and 
oﬀ er a framework of negotiations for future trade arrangements after that date.  Th e agreement stipulates 
clearly that after this deadline, a trade agreement compatible with WTO rules will have to be put in place. 
Th is arrangement was validated by WTO members during the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference in 
September 2001.
1.14  Compatibility with WTO rules
One of the most basic WTO principles – the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment – stipulates that 
a trade concession granted by a member State to another should be automatically extended to all other 
WTO members (Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariﬀ s and Trade).  Th ere are two main exceptions 
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to this MFN principle.  Th e ﬁ rst one allows preferential treatment when based on development concerns; 
the second one is with regard to free trade areas (FTAs).
As we have seen in the introduction (supra), the ﬁ rst exception has to respect the principle of non-
discrimination between countries at the same level of development.  In regard to the FTAs, Article 
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariﬀ s and Trade (GATT) deﬁ nes the modalities under which WTO 
members may waive the MFN clause.  Th e rationale which underpins this derogation from the MFN 
principle is that, under certain conditions, free-trade agreements beneﬁ t not only the members, but also 
the global economy, through trade creation which engenders an enhanced global well-being.  Agreements 
such as the EPAs would fall into this category if they are reciprocal in nature (both parties oﬀ er each other 
symmetrical preferential treatment).
However, ACP countries might want to explore possibilities of maintaining a certain degree of asymmetry 
in their future agreement with the EU.  Article XXIV leaves room for manoeuvre with regard to this 
point.  In particular, article (8-b) stipulates that duties and other restrictive regulations – are to be 
eliminated on “substantially all the trade” between the members of a preferential agreement.  Th e exact 
meaning of “substantially all the trade” is strongly debated.  How much trade may not be liberalized is a 
crucial question, and could be important for African countries willing to maintain some protection on 
some of their trade with the EU in the context of an EPA.  It is generally thought that at least 90 per cent 
of the trade has to be liberalized under a free trade agreement, but there is no legal conﬁ rmation for that 
ﬁ gure.  Th e EU-South Africa free trade agreement, for example, did interpret Article XXIV in a manner 
allowing for some protection within the 90 per cent limit, in a non-reciprocal manner.  Under this free 
trade agreement, the EU agreed to extend liberalization on 95 per cent of its trade with South Africa, 
while South Africa agreed to liberalize “only” 86 per cent of its imports from the EU.
Th e agreement, by mentioning “a reasonable length of time” (Article XXIV), maintains some ambiguity 
in the implementation schedule.  Again, there is no legal or oﬃ  cial interpretation on what a reasonable 
length of time might be, although it is conventionally thought to be 10 years.  For example, South Africa 
was oﬀ ered 12 years to implement liberalization, which was longer than the length of time the EU is 
allowed to liberalize its imports from South Africa.  Th us, this ambiguity can be utilized to maintain a 
certain degree of asymmetry.
Within the framework of the EPAs, the length of time for implementation can be a very important 
consideration for African countries, because it determines the time frame necessary for embarking on 
internal adjustments before complete liberalization.  As we shall see below, African countries cannot 
beneﬁ t from the EPAs unless:
• Full reciprocity is preceded by deepened regional integration; and
• Th e implementation time frames are long enough to allow for the necessary internal adjustments 
and absorption of the adjustment costs that such liberalization entails.
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Finally, an important consideration for African countries (and also for other developing countries) is 
that the Doha Declaration (paragraph 29) launched an eﬀ ort to clarify the understanding of Article 
XXIV and the role of special and diﬀ erential treatment in regional trade agreements.  Th ese points of 
negotiations under the WTO will be of crucial importance and could determine what form the EPAs 
will take in the future, as well as the degree of ﬂ exibility that could ﬂ ow from it for African countries. 
An adequate degree of ﬂ exibility would consequently make it possible to propagate the innovative spirit 
launched under the Lomé Conventions.
In sum, it appears that the EPAs tie in with a process that was launched under the Cotonou Agreements. 
Th is process is set apart from the innovative spirit of the Lomé Conventions and embodies cooperation 
relations between Europe and the ACP countries within the framework of deepened trade liberalization 
incorporating the reciprocity principle at the heart of the new agreements.  It is this change of perspective 
that we seek to analyse in this section on West Africa.
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II.   Africa and ECOWAS in international trade: facts and 
fi gures
While the total volume of trade has virtually doubled over the past few decades, Africa’s share of world 
trade has steadily declined, from over 7 per cent after World War II to around 2 per cent in 2002.
An eﬀ ective means by which African countries can increase their share of world trade is through increased 
intra-African trade.  In 2002, intra-African trade accounted for only 8 per cent of total trade ﬂ ows to and 
from Africa.  However, when only exports of manufactured and agricultural goods are considered, the 
share of intra-African trade comes close to 15 per cent (or $US 8.5 billion).  Historical data reveal that the 
greater part of international trade is realized within geographical areas that have attained a certain level of 
political and economic integration, such as the EU, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Th e modest performance of intra-regional trade in Africa is attributable to a number of factors, 
including:
• Inadequate or unsuitable infrastructure, which limits the cross-border trade potential as well as the 
movement of people;
• Structural constraints linked to the fact that many countries within the same region produce similar 
goods, which means that countries seek to export towards other regions; and 
• Th e eﬀ ects of regional conﬂ icts which dampen conﬁ dence between members of the same region, and 
thereby create an unfavourable environment for integration.
2.1  Th e position of ECOWAS in international trade 
Trade among the ECOWAS countries as a proportion of their total trade increased from 3 per cent in 
the early 1970s to over 10 per cent in 2001.  Th e steady growth of the share of intra-ECOWAS trade in 
the total trade has to be viewed against the relative stagnation observed over the same period in regard to 
trade between ECOWAS countries and the rest of Africa.
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Figure 1: Share of ECOWAS trade, % (1970-2001)
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In terms of trade ﬂ ows, trade between ECOWAS and the rest of Africa witnessed relatively robust growth 
during 1970-2001.  (In value terms, it increased 18 times during that period).  However, it is in intra-
ECOWAS trade where the greatest increase was observed, with a 36-fold increase during 1970-2001 (see 
Fig.2).
Figure  2: ECOWAS trade in Africa in millions of dollars  (1970-2001)
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It might be supposed at ﬁ rst that the multilateral trade negotiations in which ECOWAS countries were 
involved would vitiate this trend, because of the increase in the volume of trade with other countries. 
However, that is not as evident as it seems.  Th e dynamic eﬀ ects of the process of “opening-up” can 
foster new opportunities for intra-regional trade, particularly within the framework of strengthened 
integration.
Trade relations between ECOWAS and the EU 
Figure 3 :  ECOWAS balance of trade
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Th e trade balance between West African countries and the EU declined sharply from around 1996.  From 
a trade surplus of around $US 1.7 billion in that year, it had stabilized at around $US 2.5 billion by 2001. 
Th e overall trade balance has been very volatile.  Although nearing equilibrium towards the end of the 
period under consideration, it witnessed signiﬁ cant ﬂ uctuations throughout.  It is noteworthy that with 
regard to the rest of Africa, the region has been in equilibrium.
2.2  Exports
In terms of exports, the region did not register any signiﬁ cant export growth towards the EU during the 
1990s.  A slight decline in exports towards the EU around the mid-1990s was followed by a shift back to 
the levels reached at the beginning of the decade, i.e. around $US 3.2 billion.
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Figure 4: ECOWAS exports
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-Exports towards the rest of Africa remained stable at the relatively low level of around $US 3 billion. 
Total exports from the region, however, increased noticeably, from over $US 19 billion to nearly $US 30 
billion towards the end of the 1990s.  Exports towards the EU remained relatively stable at around $US 
10 billion.  However, while the export volumes to the EU had accounted for around half of total exports 
from the region during the early 1990s, the proportion decreased to just one-third a decade later.  Th is 
underscores the development of diversiﬁ cation of the destinations for ECOWAS exports.
2.3  Imports
ECOWAS imports from the EU increased fairly modestly (40 per cent over the whole period under 
consideration), from over $US 8 billion in 1990 to nearly $US 12 billion a decade later.  A similar trend, 
although more marked, is observable in regard to total imports, which is easily explained by the fact that 
the EU is the region’s main supplier.  However, as with the exports, the imports have been coming from 
increasingly varied suppliers.
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Figure 5 : ECOWAS imports 
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III.  General equilibrium analytical framework-the GTAP model
3.1  Why a general equilibrium model?
Trade policy analysis largely involves analysing implications of trade policy instruments on the production 
structure in economies at the national and global level.  Trade policy instruments such as tariﬀ s and 
quotas have direct and indirect eﬀ ects on the relative prices of commodities produced in a given country. 
As the mix of goods and services produced changes, so does the demand for factors of production. 
Consequently, in any given economy, it is diﬃ  cult to conceive a situation where the change in trade 
policy would aﬀ ect only one sector.  Due to the forward and backward linkages and their related strengths 
existing in a particular economy, the result is always one in which the relative mix of sectoral outputs 
changes.  Th is by extension, aﬀ ects the relative mix of the diﬀ erent sectors.
Th e country-level eﬀ ects on output mix and demands for factors of production can in the context of 
international trade be extended to the global economy.  Changes in relative prices of outputs and inputs 
resulting in a given country’s change in trade policy are transmitted to the industries and input markets of 
other economies that the country trades with.  Th erefore, for trade policy analysis to be meaningful and for 
robust results to be produced, the interactions that prevail among diﬀ erent sectors as a result of a change 
in a given country’s (or group of countries) trade policy instruments must be taken into account.  Th e 
general equilibrium methodology provides an analytical framework that allows these inter and intra sectoral 
changes in output mix, and by extension the demand for diﬀ erent factors of production, to be captured.
However, these models are not perfect, especially the static ones.  Th is is because they fail to take account 
of the dynamic eﬀ ects that accompany changes taking place from a given economy as a result of policy 
change.  Th e Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is in this class of general equilibrium models. 
GTAP is a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model designed for comparative static 
analysis of trade policy issues (Adams et al.1997).  It can be used to capture eﬀ ects on output mix, factor 
usage, trade eﬀ ects and resultant welfare distribution between countries as a result of changing trade 
policies at the country, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.  Since the GTAP model puts emphasis 
on resource allocation across economic sectors, it is a good instrument for identifying the winning and 
losing countries and sectors under policy changes involving the trade aspects of the EPAs. 
3.2  Description of the data and aggregation 
Th e GTAP model is used together with the GTAP database.  Th e database, like the model, captures 
diﬀ erent individual and composites of countries.  In this exposition, Version 5 of the database is utilized. 
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Th e base year for this version is 1997 and recognizes regions as well as 57 sectors and ﬁ ve factors of 
production.  Th us, for each individual or composite region, there are 57 sectors whose data is captured 
in the overall GTAP database.  As already pointed out, not all countries are individually captured 
in GTAP; however, all the world economies are part of the database as they could be part of a given 
composite region or included as part of the rest of the world.  Th us, global macroeconomic consistency 
holds.  Unfortunately, only a very small proportion of African countries are individually disaggregated in 
Version 5 of the database.  Th e majority of African countries are captured through one or other regional 
composites.  Th us, the ECOWAS countries fall under the “rest of sub-Saharan Africa” aggregates.
Bilateral trade data is a critical component of the GTAP database.  It is this element of bilateral trade 
ﬂ ows that transmits policy and growth shocks between countries.  Indeed, trade shares are important in 
explaining the simulation results.  Th e bilateral trade is also important when it comes to looking at the 
terms-of-trade implications.  Th e global bilateral data is sourced from the United Nations COMTRADE 
data.  Th is is supplemented with individual countries’ global trade information and trade totals or 
aggregate bilateral trade statistics such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and the World Bank.
Another important subcomponent of the GTAP database is the protection data.  Th is set of data is 
both explicit and implicit.  Explicit in the sense that tariﬀ  revenue or export revenue by commodity is 
available.  In addition, anti-dumping data by commodity and region is also obtainable.  It is implicit in 
the sense that the bilateral trade data is available both in market and world prices.  Th e key sources of the 
protection data vary.  In the case of tariﬀ s, the agricultural tariﬀ s are obtained from the Economic Research 
Service, the EU and the applied or MFN rates.  Merchandize tariﬀ s on the other hand are available from 
the World Integrated Trade Solution project of the World Bank and United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (details of WITS are presented in the section below discussing the 
SMART methodology).  Th e domestic support protection data is obtained from the OECD’s producer 
subsidy equivalent tables and this can be divided into output subsidies, input subsidies, land-based and 
capital-based payments.
In this study, the 66 regions have thus been aggregated into 12 regions with the various African countries 
or composites of countries available (table A in the annex).  In regard to the sectors, the aggregation should 
be at a level that allows for analysis of the implications of the EPA in terms of primary commodities, 
light industries, heavy industry, trade and services.  Consequently, from 57 GTAP sectors, we have come 
down to 13 sectors.
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IV.   The characteristics of the African economies 
in the GTAP database
4.1.  Macroeconomic and trade characteristics
Table 3 gives a summary of the macroeconomic and trade characteristics of the African economies based 
on the 1997 base year data in the GTAP database.  Clearly, the African economies are generally small in 
size with a GDP of less than $US 10 billion.  Th e breakdown of factors in terms of value-added shows 
the preponderance of unskilled labour.  Th is may have implications on the concentration and quality of 
goods.
Th e key aspect in the context of this study is probably the level of dependence of these economies on 
trade (table 2).  Th us, for example, the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which includes the ECOWAS 
countries, has a trade dependence25 of 57.5 per cent of GDP, which is the exact average ﬁ gure for 
Africa.
Table 2:  Macroeconomic characteristics of the African and non-African countries
CODE pays (See annex 1) EU XSC* XSF** XSS*** ROW
GDP and trade fl ows (fi nal demand, billion US$ 1997)
GDP 8254.2 139.1 50.9 156.6 20381.0
Exports 2577 34.9 16.9 41.2 3739.2
Imports 2509.9 32.2 16.1 48.9 3802.2
Trade dependence (shares, %GDP)
Exports 31.2 25.1 0.33 26.3 18.3
Imports 30.4 23.2 0.32 31.2 18.7
Factor shares (% of value added)
Land 0.4 0.5 3.23 2.2 1.3
Unskilled labour 33.4 40.7 36.78 41.7 35.8
Skilled labour 21.8 19.6 9.36 10.7 20.9
Capital 44.1 37.3 47.09 40.6 41.1
Natural resources 0.3 1.9 3.55 4.8 0.9
Source: GTAP Database Version 5 Aggregation
*South Africa and Namibia 
**  Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
*** Rest of Sub-Saharian Africa  (including ECOWAS)
25 Share of total exports and imports by reference to GDP.
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In terms of production structures, the agro-processing sector accounts for sizeable share for the rest of 
sub-Saharan Africa (XSS), which includes ECOWAS. Th e competitiveness of such industries would be 
an important question for the EPAs.
Trade and services appear to be crucial sectors in all the countries.  Th ey account for at least one-third of 
the production structures.  Th ese sectors are likely to be key areas of interest in the EPA negotiations.
Table 3: Structure de la production (% de la production)
 EU XSC* XSF** XSS*** ROW
Cereals  0.3 0.5 4.0 4.9 0.9
Vegetables  0.5 0.6 4.6 2.3 0.9
Oil seeds  0.1 0 0.4 0.5 0.2
Sugar  0.1 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.1
Cotton  0 0 0.6 0.8 0.1
Other crops  0.3 0.4 5.8 3.4 0.3
Livestock  1.3 1.9 2.4 2.9 1.3
Natural resources  0.8 5.6 9.5 11.7 2.5
Agro-processing  5.7 7 10.0 11.4 5.2
Light manufactures  5.5 5.8 4.3 5 6
Industry 23.9 22.9 9.1 9.9 23.2
Trade 16.4 18.6 19.4 20.8 16.9
Services 45.2 36.5 29.2 25.9 42.4
Total 100 100 100.0 100 100
Source:  GTAP Version 5
*   South Africa and Namibia 
** Africa Australia: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
*** Rest of Sub-Saharian Africa  (including ECOWAS) 
4.2  Trade by sectors
Tables 4 and 5 show the export and import shares by sectors of the total exports and imports of goods and 
services respectively in each of the economies.  For the rest of sub-Saharan Africa cluster, natural resources 
predominate in exports.  To a lesser extent, industrial based exports are substantial as well.
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Table 4: Share of exports by sector  (% of total exports)
 EU XSC* XSF** XSS*** ROW
Grains 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.7
Vegetables 0.7 2.1 2.3 1.6 0.6
Oil seeds 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.4
Sugar 0 0 0.1 0 0
Cotton 0 0.1 3.5 2.9 0.2
Other crops 0.4 0.5 22.9 9.8 0.7
Livestock 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4
Natural resources 1.2 11.7 19.1 48 8.2
Agro-processing 5.9 4.1 8.3 5.2 3.9
Light manufactures 10.6 7.7 5.8 3.8 10.5
Industry 61.8 57.2 16.5 13.5 56.6
Trade 7.4 8.9 8.9 6.9 8.5
Services 11.2 6.4 11.1 7.3 9.4
Total 100 100 100.0 100 100
Source: GTAP Database Version 5 
* South Africa and Namibia 
** Africa Australia: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
*** Rest of Sub-Saharian Africa  (including ECOWAS)
Th e import shares are also an important starting point in understanding the potential implications of 
the EPAs.  Table 5 shows the total imports of the various commodities into each of the countries in the 
aggregation.  Th e import structure in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (XSS) is very similar to the export 
structure.  Natural resources predominate in the imports (the XSS aggregation does not only comprise 
the ECOWAS countries).  However, the most important imports information would be the distribution 
of these imports in terms of source and type.  In other words, data on the imports from the EU into each 
of these countries would be more informative with respect to EPAs analysis particularly on the issue of 
reciprocity as this would have a bearing on the revenue implications.
Table 5: Share of imports by sector (% of  total imports)
 EU South Africa AA XSS RDM
Cereals 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.1 1
Vegetables 0.8 2.9 2.6 2.1 0.8
Oil seeds 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.5
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 EU South Africa AA XSS RDM
Sugar 0 0 0.1 0 0
Cotton 0 0.1 3.3 2.9 0.2
Other crops 0.4 0.5 23.2 10.3 0.7
Livestock 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4
Natural resources 1.2 12.7 18.6 47.6 8.1
Agro-processing 6.7 5.3 10.8 6.5 5
Light manufactures 10.8 8 6.0 3.9 11.2
Industry 61.6 55.3 16.0 12.9 55.8
Trade 7 7.9 7.8 6.2 7.7
Services 10.6 5.7 9.8 6.6 8.6
Total 100 100 100.0 100 100
4.3  Level and structure of protection: the base for the EPAs
Th e level and structure of protection as captured in the GTAP database provides the initial conditions or 
the benchmark from which the trade liberalization aspects of the EPAs would have to be assessed.  Th is 
benchmark in respect to trade liberalization analysis needs to be seen at two levels.  Th e ﬁ rst level is the 
prevailing protection against imports from the European Union.  Th e second level pertains to the intra-
African protection structure.
Table 6: Ad valorem tariﬀ s  (%)  on imports from the EU
 XSC* XSF** XSS***
Grains 38.8 19.2 11.1
Vegetables 25.6 18.4 18.4
Oilseeds 38.2 21.9 9.8
Sugar 0.2 6.1 0
Cotton 17.1 16.7 3.5
Other crops 9.2 14.0 16.6
Livestock 7.3 11.1 15
Natural resources 0.1 12.2 7.6
Agro-processing 71.4 32.3 22.9
Light manufactures 12.1 21.5 20.9
Industry 7.2 16.9 14.7
Trade 0 2.0 1.4
Services 0 2.5 4.1
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 XSC* XSF** XSS***
Average (excl. trade and services) 20.7 17.3 12.8
Average (incl. Trade and services) 17.5 15.0 11.2
Source: GTAP Database Version 5 
* South Africa and Namibia 
** Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
*** Rest of sub-Saharan Africa  (including ECOWAS)
Table 6 shows the average applied tariﬀ s on goods imported from the EU.  It can be seen that on average, 
agro-processed and light manufactures are heavily protected as evidenced by the high tariﬀ s.  It should 
also be noted that the high tariﬀ s are an important source of revenue for ECOWAS countries.  Tariﬀ  
reduction within the framework of full reciprocity to the EU could address the fragility of the broad 
macroeconomic equilibria.
Tables 7 and 8 indicate regional tariﬀ  structures.  Table 7 shows the average intra-Africa trade ad valorem 
tariﬀ s.  It can be seen from this table that African countries levy substantial tariﬀ s on intra-African trade. 
Th us, apart from the question of reciprocity to the EU, most of these intra-African tariﬀ s will have to 
be eliminated accentuating concerns regarding de-industrialization and revenue shortfalls in most of the 
countries.
Table 7: Average intra-Africa trade ad valorem tariﬀ s (%)
XSF XSC XSS
XSF 12.7 14.1 12.8
XSC 9.8 0.0 14.3
XSS 13.5 15.2 7.8
Average tariff rate 12.0 9.8 11.6
Source: GTAP Database Version 5 Aggregation
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Table 8: Average commodity tariﬀ s on intra-African trade  (%)
 AA South Africa XSS
Cereals 14.3 30.7 7.6
Vegetables 20.9 22.8 19.9
Oilseeds 18.3 34 18.4
Sugar 4.7 0.1 0
Cotton 6.3 9.5 3.6
Other crops 17.8 8.2 37.4
Livestock 6.7 5.1 12.3
Natural resources 10.6 0.7 10.3
Agro-processing 25.7 56.2 19.7
Light manufactures 22.2 13.3 17.1
Industry 17.1 4.9 17.8
Trade 2.0 0 1.2
Services 2.6 0 3
Source: ECA simulations, GTAP V.5.4
Most of the tariff barriers with respect to intra-African trade are levied on agro-processing and 
light manufactures (see Table 8). In the absence of reciprocity with the EU, there is potential 
for trade creation in the African trade if these tariff barriers were to be eliminated.26
26 Deepened regional integration, through the elimination of tariﬀ s on intra-Africa trade and non-tariﬀ  barriers, is one of the principles of the 
EPAs.
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V.  The partial equilibrium modelling framework – the WITS/
SMART model
5.1  Why a partial equilibrium model?
General equilibrium models are an important methodological tool in trade policy analysis, because 
they measure not only the direct eﬀ ects of the simulated changes, but also the indirect (second-round) 
eﬀ ects, which include inter-industry eﬀ ects and macroeconomic adjustments.  However, the majority of 
the African countries are not individually captured in the general equilibrium modelling and database 
frameworks due to lack of data disaggregation at the country level.   Only a few are individually captured, 
while the majority are part of composites of countries, viz. the “rest of SACU”, the rest of Southern 
Africa”, and the “rest of sub-Saharan Africa”, which includes ECOWAS.  Consequently, the partial 
equilibrium modelling framework emerges as a second-best option for those countries that are not 
captured individually in the GTAP database.
Th is section therefore describes the partial equilibrium modelling methodology that was used in the 
study to complement the GTAP results.  Th e main distinction that should be noted at the outset is that as 
a partial equilibrium model, the intersectoral implications (second-round eﬀ ects) of a trade policy change 
are not taken into account.  Similarly, the inter regional implications such as within a REC setting are 
also ignored in a partial equilibrium framework.  It is still possible within a partial equilibrium model to 
analyse the trade policy eﬀ ects on trade creation and diversion, welfare and even on tariﬀ  revenues.
Milner et al. (2002) provide a simple analytical framework explaining the theory behind partial 
equilibrium modelling.  Th ey note that to adequately capture the interactions between sectors and 
elasticities of substitution between factors, and to simulate dynamic eﬀ ects in their EPA study, a general 
equilibrium model would be desirable.  However, due to scarcity of individual and regional CGE models 
for developing countries, they consider that partial equilibrium models would be alternative choices. 
Milner et al. also raise a valid observation that the database for general equilibrium models lacks the 
commodity detail to take account of the speciﬁ c sensitive and special products that are of interest to 
both African countries and the EU.  Despite its shortcomings, a partial equilibrium framework is more 
suitable as it allows the utilization of widely available trade data at the appropriate level of detail to 
capture the principle of special and diﬀ erential treatment in the simulation analysis.  Partial equilibrium 
models have the advantage of working at very ﬁ ne levels of details.
A detailed analysis of the model is presented in the annex.
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VI.   Economic and welfare impact of EPAs on African 
Economies
6.1.  Th e general equilibrium analysis
In this section, we present the results of the general equilibrium simulations for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
as a whole.  Several scenarios are considered, each representing a possible option for EPA negotiations.
6.1.1  Th e baseline scenario
Th e Cotonou Partnership Agreement speciﬁ es January 1, 2008 as the date by which the EPAs should take 
eﬀ ect.  Before that date, various international agreements will have been implemented with important 
implications on the global economic landscape.  Th e main events that will precede the launch of the 
EPAs are: the enlargement of the European Union; the elimination of quotas on textiles and clothing; 
the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on domestic support and export subsidies; the 
full accession of China into the WTO; and the conclusion of the Doha Round.
It is not yet clear how the Doha Round is likely to impact on the EPAs.  Th erefore, it has not been built 
into the baseline of the EPAs as yet.  Instead, four major developments will be taken into account.
Enlargement of the EU : A harmonized and integrated trade policy is expected to be in place in the 
EU by the time the EPAs come into eﬀ ect.  In order to capture this integration, we have eliminated all 
tariﬀ s and export subsidies as well as non-tariﬀ  barriers between the EU-15 and the new 10 members. 
We have also left out trade barriers among the 10 new EU members.  Finally, all sectors in the EU-10 
have the same level of protection against the rest of the world as found in the EU-15 at the time of the 
accession.  Th is means that some of the tariﬀ  rates that the new EU members charge third countries have 
been increased or reduced to the existing levels of the old EU members.
Table 9: Required change (%) on prevailing CEEC tariﬀ s for a harmonized enlarged EU CET
NAM Japan SSA China ROW
Cereals 169.7 251.25 22.35 128.93 181.44
Vegetables -16.18 -9.38 20.83 -22.46 -29.61
Oilseeds -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00
Sugar 1521.94 1576.00 1521.94 1511.54 1598.65
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NAM Japan SSA China ROW
Cotton -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00
Other crops -77.04 -69.00 -71.82 - 80.00 -70.75
Livestock 7.33 23.23 24.07 18.83 50.00
Animal products -75.74 -0.67 -63.79 -78.69 -69.29
Fishing 83.67 1.4* 700.00 52.17 -12.20
Other natural resources -86.96 -95.24 -100.00 -86.21 -33.33
Agro-processing -24.92 43.06 -8.80 -6.73 16.27
Textiles -22.33 -8.14 159.52 -25.78 -2.15
Clothing 16.67 31.46 112.28 -42.49 -9.41
Low tech. industries -57.63 -35.21 -61.19 -44.06 -3.33
Medium tech. industries -47.95 -38.67 16.67 -36.90 -53.06
Heavy industries -60.98 -49.51 -66.67 -54.37 -69.47
Source: ECA simulations, GTAP V.5.4; 
*Tariﬀ  rate of 1.4% on ﬁ sh imports from Japan
Elimination of MFA quotas (implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing): It is 
expected that the phasing out of the multiﬁ bre agreement on textiles and clothing will have signiﬁ cant 
implications for developing countries.  It was therefore necessary to capture its likely eﬀ ects.  As with 
other studies on the subject, the elimination of the MFA was captured through elimination of the export 
tax equivalents of the textile and clothing quotas in the developed-country markets in particular.
Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement: Th e European Union has traditionally amply used 
domestic support and export subsidies especially in agriculture.  While the Doha Round negotiations are 
expected to culminate in an agreement that will have dramatic impacts on how these two instruments are 
applied, there are still outstanding issues from the Uruguay Round.  Th e baseline scenario envisages a 20 
per cent reduction for developed-country domestic support, and a rate of 13 per cent for the developing 
countries.  In the case of the agricultural export subsidies, the reductions are 36 per cent and 24 per cent 
for developed and developing countries respectively.
China accession to the WTO: Th e full accession of China to the WTO is expected to have important 
implications for both developed and developing countries.  At full accession, all WTO members will be 
expected to impose import tariﬀ s on Chinese goods on an MFN basis.  Th is was captured in the baseline 
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by reducing tariﬀ s on Chinese products to the level of the MFN tariﬀ s applied by WTO members27.
6.1.2  Scenarios for the EU-SSA Economic Partnership Agreements
Scenario 1 – SSA reciprocity to EU preferential tariﬀ s:  One of the key principles of the EPAs is 
reciprocity.  Th is scenario assesses the EPAs implications in the case of the SSA reciprocating on the 
favourable tariﬀ s it is currently receiving from the EU.
Is full reciprocity feasible under the EPAs?  As shown in table 10, the EU generally applies low tariﬀ s28 on 
imports from the SSA.  Consequently, all tariﬀ s applied by sub-Saharan Africa above those applied by the 
EU on African products are reduced to the level of the latter (full reciprocity).  Th e general idea is that 
EPAs should be negotiated essentially in order to establish a partnership compatible with the WTO and 
not necessarily to create a free-trade area, which would require full trade liberalization29.
Conversely, for sectors such as agro-processing, cereals, sugar, livestock and ﬁ shing, SSA tariﬀ s would 
have to be raised to bring them to the level of EU tariﬀ s.  However, we will not do so in this scenario, 
for two reasons.  First, in the case of agro-processing, there are the beef and sugar protocols which the 
aggregation for the EU takes into account and which are very speciﬁ c.  Secondly, the EU tariﬀ s are 
above the SSA tariﬀ s owing to tariﬀ  peaks and escalation which are distinct negotiating questions.  Th e 
protocols, peaks and escalation can be part of the EPA negotiations, but not as element of full reciprocity. 
On the basis of the table below, reciprocation will be a main issue in sectors such as textiles and clothing; 
industrial sectors; and other primary producing sectors.
Table 10: Per cent change on SSA tariﬀ s for reciprocity purposes.
EU tariffs rates on SSA SSA tariffs rates on EU SSA reciprocation (% change)
Cereals 41.6 10.5 296.2
Vegetables 14.5 17.1 -15.2
Oilseeds 0.0 9.6 -100.0
27 On the basis of the tariﬀ s currently applied on Chinese goods, the following sectors have proved to be the most   important in regard to the 
accession of China to the WTO: 
• Cereals and low-tech. industrial products in the case of the ROW; 
• Cereals, other natural resources and medium-tech. industries in the case of North America;
• Other natural resources, low-tech. and medium-tech. industries in the case of Japan; low-tech. and medium-tech. industries in the case of the 
enlarged European Union.
28 Owing to aggregation of the various products and regions, most of the tariﬀ s that the EU levies on imports from the SSA are divergent from 
zero.  Preferences do not necessarily imply duty-free access.  Th e Lome Convention granted duty-free access in respect of 95 per cent of the tariﬀ  
lines of members of the ACP group.  Over time, however, non-tariﬀ  barriers accumulated and their tariﬀ  equivalent was taken into account in 
the GTAP database whenever possible.
29 A free-trade area between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa is presented as an alternative scenario in the event that the negotiations would 
subsequently envisage the establishment of an FTA rather than what is now seen as the objective.
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EU tariffs rates on SSA SSA tariffs rates on EU SSA reciprocation (% change)
Sugar 251.4 1.5 16660.0
Cotton 0.0 3.6 -100.0
Other crops 3.1 16.1 -80.7
Livestock 36.6 11.7 212.8
Animal products 6.3 9.9 -36.4
Fishing 12.0 9.3 29.0
Energy 0.0 9.5 -100.0
Other natural resources 0.0 13.1 -100.0
Agro-processed goods 39.4 23.9 64.9
Textiles 10.9 16.4 -33.5
Clothing 12.1 29.6 -59.1
Low tech. industries 2.6 23.5 -88.9
Medium tech. industries 2.1 15.4 -86.4
Heavy industries 1.4 15.8 -91.1
Source: GTAP V.5.4  and authors’ simulation baseline
Scenario 2 – Deeper regional integration without reciprocity: Th e Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
advocates for deeper integration among ACP countries.  In this scenario, the principle of deeper regional 
integration within Africa is discussed.  Th e rationale behind this second scenario is that the reason why 
most African countries have not been able to exploit the preferences under the Lomé Agreements is the 
lack of supply capacity.  Th ese countries need to build this capacity.  Th is scenario presents an option 
where the SSA countries liberalize trade among themselves without immediate reciprocation on the 
preferences granted by the EU, such that they can eventually be able to compete with the EU producers 
and exporters.
Scenario 3 – EU – SSA free trade area: Scenarios 1 and 2 did not necessarily consider the option of 
establishing a partnership that would culminate in a free trade area.  Th us, in scenario 1, the assumption 
is that in order for the partnership to be WTO compliant, the SSA countries must reciprocate on the 
preferential treatment that they are currently receiving from the EU.  For its part, the EU takes no 
action on the commodity protocols and non-tariﬀ  barriers.  Th e objective of the second scenario is to 
provide room for building production capacity within the SSA regions before reciprocation.  In this third 
scenario, the option for an EU-SSA Free Trade Agreement is explored.  In this scenario therefore, all the 
bilateral trade barriers between the SSA and EU are eliminated.
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6.1.3  Results of the simulations
Macroeconomic, trade and welfare variables: aggregate eﬀ ects
Th e detailed results of the three scenarios are presented in the table contained in the annex.
S1.  Th e results indicate that under full reciprocity, the impacts on the volume of GDP are negative 
for all the regions other than the EU (Figure 6).  SSA’s income marginally declines.  Th e eﬀ ect of SSA’s 
reciprocation is more pronounced in the eﬀ ects on trade and welfare (as measured through equivalent 
variation).  SSA’s imports grow faster than its exports and combined with the deterioration in the terms 
of trade, its balance of trade declines by $US 1, 868 million.  Th e marginal eﬀ ect on GDP, combined 
with worsening trade balance and deteriorating terms of trade, result in loss of welfare for the SSA region 
under full reciprocity.
S2.  Trade barriers among African countries evidently limit the realization of the economic and welfare 
gains.  Th e elimination of the tariﬀ  and non-tariﬀ  barriers (scenario 2) have the potential of raising 
incomes and welfare in the SSA region.  As shown in Figures 6 and 7, a scenario where the SSA countries 
liberalize trade among themselves in an EPA without immediate reciprocity, results in gains both in terms 
of GDP and improved welfare.  While the change in balance of trade still indicates deterioration, the 
other indicators are positive in the SSA region.  Th e terms of trade which under full reciprocity register 
deterioration, improve in a deepened regional integration scenario.
Figure 6 : Income and trade eﬀ ects of EPAs scenarios
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Source: GTAP V.5.4, ECA simulation baseline
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S3.  Th e SSA region reaps the largest gains from EPAs that take the form of FTAs rather than partnerships 
that do not address all the trade barriers with EU.  Th e SSA’s GDP would expand by an additional 3.4 
per cent in an FTA agreement.   Th e terms of trade would also be more favourable.
Whereas welfare gains and the balance of trade outcomes would be more positive in an integrated SSA 
region that does not immediately reciprocate, it is an FTA that provides the highest gains to the region 
(over $US 8 billion).  Th ese gains would, however, come at a major macroeconomic adjustment cost, 
particularly in the terms of trade.
Figure 7 : Eﬀ ects on trade balance and welfare ($US million)
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Industry structure in SSA: EPAs options
Most of the sub-Saharan African countries have put in place industrial policies that endeavour to achieve 
more diversiﬁ cation in their economies.  Among the explanations that are given for the marginalization 
of SSA in global trade is lack of exports diversiﬁ cation.  As a result, the impact of EPAs on the industrial 
structure of these countries is important.  Th e table in annex 2 indicates the likely impacts of the reciprocity 
principle on industries in SSA.  Deeper regional integration could potentially provide the space for 
diversiﬁ cation in production and exports to take place.  Unlike in scenario 1 where SSA region would 
specialize in production of primary commodities, deeper regional integration allows the emergence of 
high-value-added non-primary commodity production.
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Th e region can build up production capacities in diﬀ erent industrial sectors.  However, it is in textiles 
and clothing where deepened trade in the region could provide a solid foundation for diversiﬁ cation of 
the region’s economies.  Th ese sectors will see their outputs expand by 1.2 – 2.7 per cent compared to 
contractions that could be registered in the event of scenario 1.  Another important result is the positive 
eﬀ ect for some primary producing sectors (such as vegetables, oilseeds, livestock and animal products) 
that could otherwise decline under full reciprocity.
Figures 8 and 9 indicate that even for the primary sectors, scenario 1 is unfavourable for sub-Saharan 
Africa, whereas these sectors – with the exception of natural resources exploitation – actually grow in the 
case of scenarios 2 and 3.
Figure 8: Production structure in SSA under diﬀ erent EPAs options
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Source: GTAP V.5.4, ECA simulation baseline
Clearly, most industrial sectors in sub-Saharan Africa would experience a decline in output under 
full reciprocity.  Th is contraction will be more pronounced in the sectors that are seen as the bases of 
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industrialization, namely, low- and medium-technology industries; heavy industries; and clothing and 
textiles.  Apart from cotton, energy, natural resources, other crops, and agro-processing, which could 
register a slight expansion, SSA’s industrial sectors could signiﬁ cantly decline.
Th us, the risk of de-industrialization is an important consideration if the principle of reciprocity under 
the EPAs is applied.  Th e only industrial sector likely to survive the eﬀ ects of such an arrangement is 
agro-processing, and that is because no tariﬀ  changes have been eﬀ ected for this sector.  Th ese impacts 
on the industrial structure are ampliﬁ ed in the case of an FTA.  De-industrialization is clearly a risk even 
for low-technology industries.  However, under an FTA, there will be noticeable expansion for agro-
processing and clothing and textiles.
Figure 9 : De-industrialization risk under the EPAs
Source: ECA simulation baseline GTAP V.5.4. 
Demand for and returns to factors of production
Th e three scenarios would have varying levels of adjustment costs in terms of endowments utilization. 
Figure 10 shows that, in scenario 1, the demand for unskilled labour contracts sharply in the sectors 
where there is more value added.  Conversely, this demand increases in sectors such as cotton, other 
crops, energy, natural resources and agro-processing.  Th e contractions could prove to be very costly, as 
returns to labour tend to be higher in these contracting sectors than in the primary sectors.
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Figure 10 : Volume change in unskilled labour employment
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Table 11 : Demand for endowment factors in primary and manufacturing sectors in SSA under a 
EU-SSA FTA (per cent deviation from baseline%)
Land Unskilled 
labour
Skilled 
labour
Capital Natural
Resources
Cereals 2.3449 9.0177 7.2315 7.0138 0.0368
Vegetables 0.0548 6.0083 4.2714 4.0597 0.0251
Oilseeds 0.2072 6.2081 4.4679 4.2558 0.0259
Sugar 6.4283 14.4232 12.5484 12.3198 0.0572
Cotton -6.436 -2.4318 - 4.0304 -4.2253 -0.0098
Other crops -3.0492 1.9554 0.2849 0.0813 0.0087
Livestock 0.6094 6.7356 4.9868 4.7736 0.0279
Animal products 0.1196 6.0933 4.355 4.1431 0.0254
Fishing 1.9935 7.5047 6.016 5.8343 0.0366
Energy -5.4413 -1.8293 -3.1887 -3.3547 -0.0086
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Other natural resources -4.6468 -0.8387 -2.2118 -2.3794 -0.0036
Agro-processing -4.2477 19.79 10.7919 9.7325 0.0167
Textiles -9.7968 7.6427 -1.41 -2.4699 0.0064
Clothing -6.9228 15.5495 5.8319 4.6941 0.012
Low tech. industries -12.7499 -0.1578 -8.5545 -9.5376 0.0004
Med tech. industries -11.2978 3.6367 -5.079 -6.0995 0.0034
Heavy industries -14.7534 -5.2645 -13.2317 -14.1646 -0.0037
Source: ECA simulations, GTAP V.5.4
Th e demand for the diﬀ erent factors is shown in Table 11.  Demand for most of the factors of production 
grows in the primary sectors, except for cotton.  Th e increased demand is consistent with the expansion 
of these sectors as the region specializes more on primary raw-materials production.  Th e variations in 
labour and capital demand are less homogeneous in the manufacturing sectors.  Th e low- and medium-
technology industries show a sharp contraction.  A similar result occurs in the heavy-industry sector.  By 
contrast, the agro-processing and clothing sectors would generally register increased labour and capital 
demand under the FTA.
It is useful, however, to note that the more important results relate to the realized returns to these 
factors.
43
Table 12: Real returns to factors of production in SSA (per cent deviation from base %)
Deeper integration FTA
Land 1.3223 25.0395
Unskilled labour -0.3219 -1.9728
Skilled labour 0.7898 5.1056
Capital 0.8745 6.0111
Natural resources -0.9176 -2.509
Source: ECA simulations, GTAP V.5.4
In addition to facilitating diversiﬁ cation in the industrial structure, integration in SSA also results in 
positive returns to some of the crucial factors of production.  Real returns to land, skilled labour and 
capital are positive.
Similar outcomes but on a higher scale are observable in the case of an EU-SSA FTA.  However, due to 
its abundance, real returns to unskilled labour fall.  Unlike the other factors of production whose supply 
is ﬁ xed, unskilled labour is abundant in the SSA region.  Th e fall in the real returns indicates that the 
nominal wage does not increase as fast as the other factors as a result of this abundance.
Th e returns to the factors of production and also the overall economic performance of the SSA region have 
welfare implications.  Th us, the SSA region loses from full reciprocity but gains from both the deepened-
integration and FTA scenarios.  Th e next section aﬀ ects a breakdown of the determinants of the welfare 
change under each of these scenarios, in order to highlight the potential implications of each.
Sources of welfare changes: breakdown
At the aggregate level, full reciprocity entails welfare losses for all regions, with the exception of the EU. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to suﬀ er a welfare loss of $US 564 million.  Table 13 shows the determinants 
of this welfare loss.  Th e worsening terms-of-trade that the SSA region faces explains more than half of the 
deterioration in welfare.  In other words, the inability of the exports to pay for the imports-boost ﬂ owing 
from reciprocity will result in the African countries being worse-oﬀ  in an EPA with full reciprocity. 
Moreover, the region will also experience a welfare loss emanating from deterioration in the investment 
– savings balance.  Th e only positive determinant of the welfare is the $US 45.7 million resulting from 
the endowment changes30.  Th is is attributable to a net increase in demand for the unskilled labour.
30 Th e macroeconomic closure in the GTAP scenarios discussed here allows the supply for unskilled labour to be endogenous by ﬁ xing the 
nominal wage for the same labour category.  Th e endowment change creating a positive impact on welfare is in this case associated to the 
endogenous unskilled labour rather than the other factors of production.
44
Table 13: Source of welfare changes by region ($US million)
  Effi ciency Endowment
changes
Terms of trade Investment savings
balance
Total
Reciprocity 347.4 0 1412.8 -11.5 1748.8
EU15 Integration -34 0 -116.9 0.4 -150.5
FTA 628.9 0 503.9 -16.4 1116.3
Reciprocity 5.4 0 -22.9 14.9 -2.5
CEEC Integration -1.4 0 -2.1 -1.8 -5.3
FTA 8.8 0 -124.9 -15.7 -131.8
Reciprocity -12 0 -91.3 20.2 -83.2
NAM Integration -0.6 0 -46.4 -11.2 -58.2
FTA -24.9 0 -360.5 -53.5 -438.9
Reciprocity -19.2 0 -125.8 99.2 -45.8
Japan Integration -6.3 0 -41 2.1 -45.2
FTA -55.5 0 -364.7 107.1 -313.1
Reciprocity -71.6 45.7 -323 -215.1 -563.9
SSA Integration 168.6 844.7 174.4 16.7 1204.3
FTA 878.2 6112 1104.3 -65.8 8028.8
Reciprocity -16.1 0 -77.3 36.1 -57.3
China Integration -2 0 -14.4 -0.1 -16.5
FTA -28.5 0 -149.2 33.5 -144.2
Reciprocity -201.7 0 -775 55.2 -921.5
ROW Integration -12.8 0 46.1 -6.2 27.1
FTA -274.6 0 -620.1 11.1 -883.6
Source: GTAP V.5.4, and ECA computations
Th e intra-SSA trade barriers impose a substantial cost to the region.  Th eir elimination, in an EPA whose 
objective is to create competitiveness through deepened regional integration, would lead to the region 
reaping around $US 1,204 million in welfare gains.  Th is gain would emanate mainly from the change 
in endowments utilization, better terms of trade in the region and removal of distortions that currently 
result in ineﬃ  cient allocation of the endowments utilized.
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7.  Evaluation of the impact of the EU-ECOWAS Economic 
Partnership Agreement using a partial equilibrium model
In this chapter we analyse the results of a simulation representing full liberalisation of EU imports 
in ECOWAS countries, using a partial equilibrium model, WITS-SMART31 A full ﬂ edged free trade 
agreement need not be the outcome on the EPA negotiations, as Article XXIV of the GATT leaves 
some leaway for less than full reciprocity. Nevertheless we choose to simulate the impact of a complete 
dismantlement of tariﬀ s in order to clearly expose the eﬀ ects of trade liberalisation on all the products in 
ECOWAS countries. Th is is therefore an “extreme scenario” which aims at delineating the general trends 
of the impact of liberalisation of West-African economies under the EPA.  
Th e chapter is divided in three sections. Th e ﬁ rst section describes the simulation results on levels of 
EU exports to ECOWAS. A second section analyses the simulation’s results on intra-ECOWAS trade, 
including the produces that would be most aﬀ ected by trade diversion. Finally a third section looks at the 
results of the model on tariﬀ  revenues and welfare in the West-African countries.
7.1. Simulating the EPA impact on ECOWAS imports from the EU
Th is section looks at the trade creation eﬀ ect enjoyed by EU countries under full liberalisation of 
ECOWAS imports and at how these additional EU exports would be spread. Th is may provide some 
useful insights to ECOWAS countries, in view of the EPA negotiations.
Increased EU exports to ECOWAS:
For negotiations purposes, it is interesting to look at which EU countries are bound to beneﬁ t the most 
from the ECOWAS tariﬀ  elimination. In total, the 25 EU countries could gain more than 1.87 billion 
US$ of increased exports to ECOWAS countries32.  
Table 14 shows clearly that the largest gainer would be France (26% of the additional exports, at just 
under 500 millions US$ of increased exports), followed by the UK (almost 17% of total export gains). 
Together, these two countries plus Germany (15.5%), Italy (11.4%) and Belgium (9.7%) should reap-up 
more than 80% of the increased exports to ECOWAS. 
31 A detailed presentation of the WITS-SMART model is available in annex.
32 In this paper and when in the context of partial equilibrium analysis, we are using the denomination “ECOWAS region” for those countries of 
this region that have provided statistical information to the WITS database. Th erefore, the denomination excludes Cape Verde, Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. On the other hand it includes Mauritania, which –although not an ECOWAS Member State is associated with it in the EPA 
negotiation process.
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On the contrary, the ten newly acceded countries, as well as Denmark, Portugal, Austria, Greece, Finland, 
Ireland and Luxembourg would obtain less than 1% each of this increase in exports.
Table 14: Increase in exports after EPA for individual EU countries
EU member Total export gains in US$ 
‘000
Share in the total 
increased exports (%)
Increase in country’s 
total exports
France 494 701.682 26.35% 0.135%
United Kingdom 317 568.463 16.92% 0.104%
Germany 290 904.736 15.50% 0.039%
Italy 214 476.41 11.43% 0.070%
Belgium 181 499.797 9.67% 0.071%
Spain 155 843.714 8.30% 0.100%
Netherlands 128 380.381 6.84% 0.050%
Sweden 21 443.278 1.14% 0.021%
Denmark 17 732.954 0.94% 0.027%
Portugal 10 302.314 0.55% 0.034%
Ireland 9 875.546 0.53% 0.011%
Greece 9 802.571 0.52% 0.074%
Austria 5 679.704 0.30% 0.006%
Poland 5 526.02 0.29% 0.010%
Czech Republic 3 605.06 0.19% 0.007%
Luxembourg 3 447.433 0.18% 0.034%
Finland 2 549.182 0.14% 0.005%
Hungary 1 838.327 0.10% 0.004%
Cyprus 799.151 0.04% 0.087%
Malta 639.962 0.03% 0.025%
Slovenia 318.949 0.02% 0.002%
Estonia 99.47 0.01% 0.002%
Lithuania 95.195 0.01% 0.001%
Slovak Republic 85.232 0.00% 0.000%
Latvia 1.045 0.00% 0.000%
Total 1 877 216.6 100.00% 0.062%
% 100.00%   
Source: simulation WITS-SMART, CEA, and UNCTAD handbook of statistics 2004.
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Such information might be of interest for ECOWAS countries to identify which EU countries could have 
the greatest stakes in negotiating an EPA with them.  Th ese EU countries will have a decisive role in the 
negotiations on the non-trade aspects of the EPA, including the aid package. 
Th e importance of the increased exports remains very limited for EU countries. As is observed in table 
14, the size of the increase in exports is marginal relatively to the overall EU exports. For example, France 
would only see her overall exports increase by 0.135% under an EPA. 
Geographical repartition of EU’s increased exports in ECOWAS
• Repartition in ECOWAS of EU’s increased exports
It is also noteworthy to check the relative importance of each ECOWAS country in the total additional 
exports from the EU in case of EPA. Th is shows where in ECOWAS the EU country will gain additional 
exports. Th is is also informative for the negotiations process as it shows each ECOWAS country its 
relative bargaining power in the negotiations.
As can be infererd from graph 11, the relative importance of Nigeria is very obvious, with 42% of 
additional EU exports. Ghana comes second at 20% of the increased exports. Th us, Nigeria and Ghana 
together represent 62% of the increased exports for the EU, they will therefore probably enjoy a relatively 
important negotiating power in the negotiations on EPA. 
Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal would take up respectively 11% and 9% of the EU’s gains in exports to the 
region. Th e other countries joined together would represent an increase of 18% of exports to the West-
African region. 
Graph 11: geographical repartition of increased EU exports in ECOWAS
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•       Increase in EU’s exports by ECOWAS countries
We are also able to show the progression of EU exports to each ECOWAS country after the EPA. For 
the region on average, EU exports would increase by some 15%. Th e progression of EU exports seem 
to be the strongest in Ghana (37%), perhaps reﬂ ecting relatively high tariﬀ s in that market prior to 
liberalisation33.
Table 15: Increase in EU exports to individual ECOWAS countries after EPA (%)
Country EU exports before EPA 
(US$’000)
Increase after EPA 
(US$’0001)
Increase after EPA in %
Benin 281,275.142 75,176.31 26.73%
Burkina Faso 199,397.396 49,663.50 24.91%
Cote d’Ivoire 1,054,655.75 215,269.49 20.41%
Ghana 984,692.63 369,687.10 37.54%
Guinea Bissau 49,181.79 10,974.08 22.31%
Mali 282,561.925 59,163.39 20.94%
Mauritania 158,541.664 33,808.49 21.32%
Niger 154,115.26 43,804.61 28.42%
Nigeria 8,150,738.806 793,311.17 9.73%
Senegal 772,894.729 161,531.91 20.90%
Togo 285,470.605 64,826.52 22.71%
Total/Average 12,373,525.7 1,877,216.58 15.17%
Source : simulation ECA, WITS-SMART
Among ECOWAS countries, the diﬀ erences in the relative increases in EU exports are not very important 
(approximately 17% diﬀ erence between the two extreme Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire). Apart from Ghana 
the other ECOWAS countries would all experience an increase in their exports from the EU ranging 
between 20 and 30%. 
However, it is important here to recall that for West-African countries, the largest share of imports comes 
from the European Union (cf. section 2). EPA would therefore strengthen the dependence of ECOWAS 
countries on the EU as a source of imports.
Th e next section analyses the impact of an EPA on intra-ECOWAS trade.
33 According to a rough proxy (simple average applied tariﬀ ), Ghana has the second highest tariﬀ s in the zone (14.82%), second to Nigeria only 
(27.27%). 
49
7.2.   Trade diversion in ECOWAS countries
Th is section looks at the possible trade diversion impactof the EPA on ECOWAS countries. It starts 
with a presentation of the losses in intra-regional trade incurred by the ECOWAS countries, due to the 
substitution of intra-regional exports by EU products. Th en, it will attempt to identify which products 
could be most aﬀ ected by losses of intra-regional trade. Th ese products are the one that would suﬀ er 
the most intensively from EU competition. A country by country description of vulnerable products is 
provided in annex.
Trade diversion is the quantity of exports that is being replaced by EU products after liberalization. We 
assume here that the eﬀ ect of the elimination of the tariﬀ  is fully transmited to consumer prices. 
Table 16 provides information on trade diversion in ECOWAS in the case of a total liberalisation of EU 
imports.
Table 16: Trade diversion in West-Africa in case of EPA
ECOWAS 
member
Total trade diversion 
(US$ ‘000) a
Magnitude in trade 
diversion (%)
Intra-regional trade 
diverted b (US$’000)
Variation in intra-
regional trade (%)
Nigeria -175,576.17 -6.23% -4,565.93 -4.17%
Ghana -101,924.75 -10.08% Error! Not a valid 
link.
-17.06%
Cote d’Ivoire -26,441.89 -4.23% -1,771.99 -4.44%
Senegal -16,937.44 -4.14% 0.00 0.00%
Benin -14,119.14 -4.07% -2,695.30 -2.76%
Burkina Faso -9,180.22 -3.00% -2,883.31 -2.05%
Togo -6,494.01 -2.95% 0.00 0.00%
Mauritania -5,301.69 -3.12% -248.05 -5.40%
Mali -4,454.20 -4.75% 0.00 0.00%
Niger -4,271.86 -9.20% 0.00 0.00%
Guinea Bissau -669.02 -4.68% 0.00 0.00%
Total -365,370.39 -6.03% -35,662.67 -6.73%
Source: Simulation WITS-SMART, ECA
(a): Loss of exports from non-EU countries to ECOWAS; (b): Loss of exports from ECOWAS countries to other ECOWAS 
countries.
In total, net trade diversion amounts to US $ 365 millions. Th e part of this trade diversion that represents 
forgone exports of Western African countries to the rest of the region amounts to US$ 35.6 millions, 
or about 9.8% of the total trade diversion. Th is amount is signiﬁ cantly higher than for other African 
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RECs34, which may mean that in the case of ECOWAS, the EPA could have a more negative impact on 
regional integration than in other African regions.
It is interesting for ECOWAS policy makers to identify in more details how this reduction of intra-
regional trade could take place. Th e products aﬀ ected will be listed in the next section and the annexes 
show a country by country detailed analysis. 
It is also important for trade policy makers to know clearly in which ECOWAS countries their exports will 
decline the most sharply. Graphich 12 shows that nearly two third of the intra-regional trade diversion 
would occur in Ghana (US$ 23  millions out of 35).
Graph 12: geographical repartition of the fall of intra-ECOWAS trade (by destination market)
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Sources: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
ECOWAS countries would also lose exports in Nigeria (approximately US$ 4.5 millions), in Burkina 
Faso (approximately US$ 2.9 millions), in Benin (approximately US$ 2.7 millions), in Côte d’Ivoire 
(approximately 1.8 million), and to a lesser extent, in Mauritania (approximately US$ 250,000). It 
appears that no intra-regional trade would be replaced in other West-African countries. Th is may be 
accountable to the low complimentarity of production structures in West-Africa, but it could also be 
due to the fact that a large part of intra-regional trade in Africa takes place informally and is thus not 
34  According to our calculations using WITS-SMART, the share of intra-regional trade in overall trade diversion is approximately 6% in the case 
of ESA, 2% in the case CEMAC and only 1% in the case of SADC.  See “Economic and Welfare impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership 
Agreements”, By Stephen Karingi, Rémi Lang, Nassim Oulmane, Romain Perez, Mustapha Sadni-Jallab and Hakim Ben Hammouda.
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recorded oﬃ  cially35. Th is fact can also be alleged to the variable quality of the TRAINS data which 
are used in WITS-SMART simulations. Indeed, for some of these countries, COMTRADE data show 
higher intra-regional trade, which may lead to think that our data underestimate the impact of the EPA 
on intra-regional trade diminution. 
It seems, therefore that full trade liberalisation would contradict the EPA’s objective of strengthening 
regional integration, through a signiﬁ cant diminution of intra-regional trade (-9.8%). ECOWAS policy 
makers may therefore want to consider measures aiming at mitigating intra-regional trade losses. Th is 
could include programmes aiming at  strengthening the competitiveness of the concerned enterprises. For 
those most sensitive sectors, the tariﬀ  dismantlment should be conducted gradually and under a longer 
time scheldule than for non sensitive products. Safeguards measures should also be available in ECOWAS 
to protect national as well as regional producers in case of a surge of imports from the EU. Finally it 
should be stressed again that there is scope under the multilateral rules for less than full reciprocity.
Intra-regional trade diversion in West-Africa: which countries are aﬀ ected and for what products? 
Th e section above showed the market in ECOWAS where intra-regional trade diversion could occur, 
according to our simulations. Th is section identiﬁ es the ECOWAS countries that are bound to loose 
market shares in the region. 
Results detailed at the country level are available in annex, including for each country, a list of vulnerable 
products. In this section, results are aggregated at the regional level and at the HS 2 level.
In order to obtain exporter’s losses, we checked for declared diminution in imports from each ECOWAS 
countries available. As a number of countries are not available in the WITS model36, it is likely that these 
numbers are under-estimated.
Table 17 presents the details of trade diversion for ECOWAS countries seen from the exporters point of 
view, in case of the elimination of all tariﬀ s on EU imports.   It appears that Togo would be the greatest 
loser, in absolute terms, of the EPA (US$ -11.5 million), followed by Côte d’Ivoire (approximately US$ 
- 9 millions).
35 Th ese might be the case, among other examples of Ghanaian exports to Côte d’Ivoire, which are not recorded for the year selected in Côte 
d’Ivoire.
36 As Cape Verde, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are not available in WITS-SMART, we do not know if other ECOWAS countries suﬀ er a 
loss in exports to them after EPA.
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Table 17: Diminution of intra-regional exports in ECOWAS after an EPA
Exporter Exports to 
ECOWAS before 
the EPA in US$’000
Variation of exports 
to ECOWAS after 
EPA in US$ ‘000
Variation of exports 
to ECOWAS in %
Share in the 
overall regional 
exports diminution
Benin 30266.08 -3528.994 -11.66% 9.90%
Burkina Faso 33662.243 -2038.364 -6.06% 5.72%
Cape Verde 393.558 -45.704 -11.61% 0.13%
Cote d’Ivoire 179563.204 -8911.388 -4.96% 24.99%
Gambia 741.491 -31.873 -4.30% 0.09%
Ghana 25565.798 -1202.477 -4.70% 3.37%
Guinea 1476.302 -114.734 -7.77% 0.32%
Guinea-Bissau 621.682 -20.667 -3.32% 0.06%
Liberia 860.39 -126.459 -14.70% 0.35%
Mali 3540.064 -475.268 -13.43% 1.33%
Mauritania 53029.969 -1654.508 -3.12% 4.64%
Niger 27406.863 -2384.88 -8.70% 6.69%
Nigeria 40423.675 -1890.117 -4.68% 5.30%
Senegal 61478.927 -1717.134 -2.79% 4.81%
Sierra Leone 445.726 -22.296 -5.00% 0.06%
Togo 70904.469 -11497.993 -16.22% 32.24%
Grand Total 530380.441 -35662.856 -6.72% 100.00%
Source: ECA, WITS-SMART.
Th e fall in exports to the region woud be hardest for Togolese exporters (-16.22%). Th e last column of 
table 17 also shows that Togo would account for nearly one third (32.24%) of the total loss in regional 
exports. Exports to the rest of the region would also decrease in the case of Liberia (-14.70%), Mali (-
13.43%), Benin (-11.66%) and Cape Verde (-11.61%). All of these countries are LDCs. On the other 
hand, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania Nigeria and Senegal seem rather less exposed 
to a fall in their exports to ECOWAS in case of EPA. Th is might be due to low levels of exports to the 
region, to low elasticity of demand for the goods they exports as well as little competition from the EU 
on some of the goods traded regionally.
Th e fact that some countries may experience signiﬁ cant diminution of exports in the region also calls for 
measures to hasten deeper integration as soon as possible and before the dismantlement of tariﬀ s on EU 
goods.
Overall however, the magnitude of these exports losses seems relatively benign for ECOWAS countries, 
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when compared to their total exports levels. Table 18 below shows that on average, total exports from 
ECOWAS countries would fall by only 0.10%. Th e country where the fall would be highest is Togo, with 
a fall of overall exports of a low magnitude (-1.87 %). 
Here again, we are only looking at the eﬀ ect of the EU-ECOWAS EPA. EPAs between the EU and 
other African regions (CEMAC, ESA, SADC) are also likely to create trade diversion to the detriment of 
ECOWAS exporters. Further intra-African trade liberalisation could be a useful to prevent such potential 
losses. In addition, one has to take into account that ECOWAS exporters may beneﬁ t from improved 
market access to the EU under the EPA.
Table 18: Comparing the loss after EPA to total exports of ECOWAS countries
ECOWAS 
country
Total exports in 2003 in US$ ‘000 Fall after ECOWAS EPA Export diminution in %
Benin 554,000.00 -3528.994 -0.64%
Burkina Faso 326,000.00 -2038.364 -0.63%
Cape-Verde 13,600.00 -45.704 -0.34%
Côte d’Ivoire 5,843,940.00 -8911.388 -0.15%
Gambia 6,980.00 -31.873 -0.46%
Ghana 2,105,500.00 -1202.477 -0.06%
Guinea 516,520.00 -114.734 -0.02%
Guinea-Bissau 68,650.00 -20.667 -0.03%
Liberia 230,000.00 -126.459 -0.05%
Mali 929,960.00 -475.268 -0.05%
Mauritania 343,000.00 -1654.508 -0.48%
Niger 338,610.00 -2384.88 -0.70%
Nigeria 22,213,960.00 -1890.117 -0.01%
Senegal 1,330,520.00 -1717.134 -0.13%
Sierra Leone 92,250.00 -22.296 -0.02%
Togo 615,690.00 -11497.993 -1.87%
Total 35,529,180.00 -35662.856 -0.10%
Sources: WITS-SMART simulations, UNCTAD handbook of statistics (2004)
Vulnerable products at the regional level.
Using WITS-SMART, we isolated the products that may be exposed to the steepest decline in exports 
to the rest of the region for ECOWAS exporters. Th is allows the trade authorities to consult with the 
concerned members of the private sector to inform them of the challenges induced by the EPA and 
possibly to set up measures to facilitate the adaptation of the private sector.
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We gathered in table 19 the products that seem to experience the largest diminution in intra-regional 
trade. Th ese groups of products account for approximately 85% of the total loss in intra-regional exports. 
We also show some categories of products at the bottom of the table for which the fall in exports is large 
proportionally to the volumes exported before the EPA, albeit the volumes exported are quite low and 
account for a small fraction of the overall total export loss. For example meat and meat oﬀ al would see 
their exports fall by 22%, even through they account for only 0.3% of the overall export loss.
Table 19: Most vulnerable products to trade diversion in case of EPA in ECOWAS
H.S. 
chapter
Description (HS-2) Exports before 
EPA (US$’000)
Change in 
exports ($ ‘000)
Variation in 
exports in%
Share of each 
HS chapter in 
total export loss
HS.27 Mineral fuels, oils & product 
of their  distillation
127699.262 -19404.009 -15.20% 54.41%
HS.03 Fish & crustacean, mollusc & 
other  aquatic invert
54995.081 -1657.476 -3.01% 4.65%
HS.52 Cotton. 32750.892 -1318.707 -4.03% 3.70%
HS.11 Products .milling .industry; 
malt; starches;  insulin; 
wheat g
6351.449 -982.784 -15.47% 2.76%
HS.38 Miscellaneous chemical 
products.
21112.759 -831.937 -3.94% 2.33%
HS.87 Vehicles o/t railway/tramway 
roll-stock, pts  & access
8534.886 -783.811 -9.18% 2.20%
HS.04 Dairy prod; birds’ eggs; 
natural honey;  edible pr
3544.213 -782.353 -22.07% 2.19%
HS.21 Miscellaneous edible 
preparations.
18889.323 -706.943 -3.74% 1.98%
HS.63 Other made up textile 
articles; sets;  worn clothing
6237.468 -643.097 -10.31% 1.80%
HS.39 Plastics and articles thereof. 10087.896 -591.749 -5.87% 1.66%
HS.85 Electrical machinery equip 
parts thereof;  sound record
8835.123 -519.222 -5.88% 1.46%
HS.19 Preparation .of cereal, fl our, 
starch/milk;  pastry cooks’
4688.247 -514.768 -10.98% 1.44%
HS.24 Tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes
19915.278 -511.254 -2.57% 1.43%
HS.22 Beverages, spirits and 
vinegar.
2388.745 -336.825 -14.10% 0.94%
HS.20 Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts 
or other  parts of
1325.182 -280.206 -21.14% 0.79%
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H.S. 
chapter
Description (HS-2) Exports before 
EPA (US$’000)
Change in 
exports ($ ‘000)
Variation in 
exports in%
Share of each 
HS chapter in 
total export loss
HS.33 Essential oils & resinoids; 
perfumes,  cosmetic/toilet
2326.002 -262.542 -11.29% 0.74%
HS.94 Furniture; bedding, mattress, 
matt  support, cushion
1530.945 -189.05 -12.35% 0.53%
HS.02 Meat and edible meat offal 482.668 -106.794 -22.13% 0.30%
HS.83 Miscellaneous articles of 
base metal.
737.472 -87.466 -11.86% 0.25%
HS.69 Ceramic products. 626.703 -77.681 -12.40% 0.22%
HS.37 Photographic or 
cinematographic goods.
367.785 -42.871 -11.66% 0.12%
Grand 
Total
530380.441 -35662.856 -6.72% 100.00%
Source: WITS-SMART simulation, ECA.
From our simulations, it appears that more than half of the overall decline in export revenue in case of 
an EPA would happen for fuels and oil products (HS chapter 27). Most of this loss would occur in the 
market of Ghana. Th e HS. 6 line involved is 27 10 0037.
Other products for which West Africa could be subject to a sizeable fall in its export revenues due to trade 
diversion include:
• ﬁ sh and crustacean (-1.6 million dollars),
• cotton (-1.3 million dollars)38
• products of the milling industry (almost a million dollars),
• miscellaneous chemical products (-831 000 dollars),
• vehicles (-780 000 dollars)39,
• dairy products and eggs (-782 000 dollars),
• miscellaneous edible preparation (-706 000 dollars),
Some of these products may have a signiﬁ cant content in local input, and their demise on local markets 
might very well have important negative consequences up-stream in the production chain of the region (ﬁ sh, 
edible preparations, dairy, other agro-food products). Th e decline in exports in these products could also 
have a signiﬁ cant negative impact on the poorest categories of Western-Africans, including on rural workers. 
Such potential eﬀ ects ought to be further investigated to determine if the EPA’s impact on poverty.
37 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude; preparations not elsewhere speciﬁ ed or included, containing by 
weight 70% or more of petroleum oils or of oils obtained from bituminous minerals.
38 Mainly textile products and fabrics containing cotton.
39 Th ese are likely to be either used vehicles or re-exports.
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7.3   Impact in terms of revenues and welfare
Revenue implications
As would be expected, the elimination of tariﬀ s on imports from the EU is shown to harm the government 
revenues in West African countries. Th e extent of revenue shortfall varies across the countries as indicated 
in table 20. 
It is in the large and most open economies that the revenue reduction is highest. Nigeria will ave to forego 
up to US$ 427 million and Ghana US$194 million. 
Table 20: Revenue implications of a EU-ECOWAS EPA (US$)
Country Revenue Shortfall
Nigeria -426,902,557.50
Ghana -193,683,365.00
Cote d’Ivoire -112,236,538.00
Senegal -80,203,188.50
Benin -39,523,104.00
Togo -35,471,728.00
Mali -33,141,747.00
Burkina Faso -22,003,937.50
Niger -20,487,214.00
Mauritanie -14,572,779.00
Guinea-Bissau -7,170,527.00
Total -985,396,685.50
Source: simulation WITS-SMART, ECA.
Due to lower levels of imports in smaller economies, their loss in tariﬀ  revenues is logically smaller. For 
example, Guinea-Bissau would according to our simulations forego only about US$7 million. 
It is important to note however that the revenue loss indicated by our simulations relates to imports 
tariﬀ  revenues. In reality, the increased imports presented earlier resulting from trade creation are in 
most countries subject to indirect taxes such as the VAT. As such, as long as there is rapid increase in the 
volume and value of imports into the ECOWAS countries, and these countries have indirect taxes such as 
VAT, then the revenue shortfall described will be mitigated. However, unless the elasticity of the VAT and 
indirect taxes is signiﬁ cantly higher than that for import duties, it is unlikely that the addition indirect 
taxes revenues will outweigh the revenue foregone from the import tariﬀ s. 
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In some cases, the bulk of the loss of revenues comes from the elimination of tariﬀ s on goods that 
could easily be taxed otherwise (excise duty for example). For example, mineral fuels and oils could 
be submitted to an excise tax in Ghana to countervail the drastic fall in revenue this country would 
experience on oil products..
Nevertheless, in terms of evaluating the EPAs for ECOWAS countries, it can be noted that the revenue 
foregone is likely to have negative impacts on other government programmes. When this is combined 
with the feature of undermining regional integration, one is left with a picture that goes beyond the 
normal international trade theory arguments. Th e question about the signiﬁ cance of non-economic 
reasons for integration comes into play.
It is therefore necessary to look closer at the real weight of such a revenue loss on Government’s ﬁ nance. 
Table 21 shows how much of their total revenue the West African Governments could loose after the 
EPA40. To design this table we compared the loss in tariﬀ  revenue provided by our simulation to the total 
budget revenues (excluding grants) for the ECOWAS countries, for the same years as the ones for which 
the simulations were ran.
Table 21 shows that on average, if the EPA entails full liberalisation of EU imports, ECOWAS countries 
would have to forgoe tariﬀ  revenues amounting to almost 4% of their budget. However, one can also 
observe signiﬁ cant disparities among countries concerning the relative importance of their tariﬀ  revenue 
loss,
Table 21: fall in total government revenues after EPA
Country Revenue diminution in US$’000 Loss in total budget revenues in% 
Guinea-Bissau -7,170.53 -19.38%
Ghana -193,683.37 -19.15%
Togo -35,471.73 -12.53%
Niger -20,487.21 -7.63%
Mauritania -14,572.78 -7.08%
Benin -39,523.10 -6.73%
Burkina Faso -22,003.94 -6.06%
40 We used diﬀ erent sources to compile total government revenue (excluding grants), depending on availability of data matching the year selected 
for the simulation. Benin: IMF 2003, Burkina Faso: IMF 2002, Côte d’Ivoire: IMF 2002, Ghana: Bank of Ghana (http://www.bog.gov.gh/), 
Guinea Bissau: IMF 2003, Mali: BCEAO: “Evolution de la situation économique, ﬁ nancière et monétaire dans les Etats Membres de l’UEMOA 
en 2004 et perspectives pour l’année 2005”, Mauritania: IMF 2001, Niger: IMF 2003, Nigeria: IMF 2003, Senegal: Ministère de l’Economie et 
des ﬁ nances, Projet de Loi de ﬁ nance 2003 (http://www.ﬁ nances.gouv.sn/loifmt03.html), Togo: BCEAO opus cite. For exchange rates, historical 
interbank rates have been used: http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic.
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Country Revenue diminution in US$’000 Loss in total budget revenues in% 
Senegal -80,203.19 -6.00%
Cote d’Ivoire -112,236.54 -5.62%
Mali -33,141.75 -4.46%
Nigeria -426,902.56 -2.34%
Total ECOWAS -985,396.69 -3.93%
Source: simulation WITS-SMART, ECA.
Although the loss of revenue for Guinea Bissau was the lowest in our sample in absolute terms, it is the 
highest in terms of its share of total Government revenues: 19.38%. 
Our data also shows large losses in overall budget resources for Ghana (19%). In the case of this country 
the year used for the simulation was 2000. Recent data seem to show that the Ghanian authority have 
reached some success in diversifying their overall budget resources away from tariﬀ  revenue, therefore 
more recent data could show a smaller loss.
Togo also displays a signiﬁ cant fall in total budget ressources: -12%. Most of the other countries seem to 
be loosing beween 5 and 7% of budget revenue. Nigeria would only experience a loss of 2%, due to the 
large share of oil royalties in the total government ressources.
For most of these countries, the losses in overall budget revenue seems signiﬁ cant. Clearly, the countries 
that will commit to trade liberalisation in the EPA context will need to build a new ﬁ scal base to be able 
to cope with the loss in tariﬀ  revenue. Some African countries, such as Senegal have scored some success 
in developing a new ﬁ scal regime, based on VAT. Nevertheless, ECOWAS countries will probably need 
assistance from the EU in building a new ﬁ scal system to replace the budget revenue losses incurred after 
the EPA. ECOWAS countries will also probably need to lower their tariﬀ s on EU imports in a gradual 
way so as to smoothen the fall in their budget revenues. 
Welfare implications
Consumer surplus is shown in Table 22. 
Table 22: Welfare (consumer surplus) implications of a EU-ECOWAS EPA (US$)
Country Consumer Surplus
Nigeria 113,346,061.50
Ghana 71,478,699.50
Cote d’Ivoire 16,206,072.00
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Country Consumer Surplus
Senegal 12,470,439.50
Bénin 6,595,922.00
Togo 5,462,732.50
Mali 4,482,770.00
Niger 3,904,466.00
Burkina Faso 3,834,553.00
Mauritania 2,471,498.50
Guinea-Bissau 221,876.00
Source: WITS/SMART Simulations, ECA.
Th e consumers in the ECOWAS countries will derive signiﬁ cant gains from the EPAs as they will have 
access to goods at lower prices. To this point, it is assumed that the EU producers and exporters will 
not be pricing to market. In other words, there is an implicit assumption that the EU exporters and the 
ECOWAS importers will pass on the beneﬁ ts of the tariﬀ s reduction to the ECOWAS consumers. If the 
beneﬁ ts for tariﬀ  dismantlement are not passed on to the ECOWAS consumers but are captured by the 
exporter or the importer, it is possible that there will be no increase in consumer welfare. 
It is therefore crucial to ensure that the welfare is transmitted to consumers that competition policy ensure 
that there would be no abuse of potential dominant positions or no collusion from large importers. 
Competition policy capacities and the judicial system supporting it should therefore be  stengthened to 
ensure that EPA’s deliver their potential beneﬁ ts.
However, it should be noted that the overall economic welfare eﬀ ects are not clear within a partial 
equilibrium modelling framework since producer surplus changes especially due to supplanting of 
domestic producers by the EU producers has not been captured in this analysis. 
Nonetheless, the big economies of ECOWAS that is, Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire could experience 
substantial consumer surplus gains. Besides, Senegal and other countries are also likely to obtain some 
signiﬁ cant improvement in their consumer welfare.
While recognising the weakness of the consumer surplus as a proxy for welfare implications of the EPAs, 
the partial equilibrium results tell only part of the story. Indeed, increased imports through trade creation 
do not only beneﬁ t consumers in the ECOWAS region. In addition to this are potential gains likely to 
emanate from embodied technologies in some of the imports, that might eventually be welfare enhancing. 
Th is will however depend on whether capital equipments and machineries and such imports that tend to 
have embodied technologies are already zero-rated as tends to be the case in most countries or not. 
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Like in the case of trade eﬀ ects (creation and diversion), the outcomes through EPAs reciprocity will 
depend on the initial conditions. Th erefore, for countries like Burkina Faso and Mauritania, which have 
been fast trade liberalisers, the welfare implications might seem small because the required changes in the 
reciprocation to the EU preferences are not major. 
Ultimately though, all the ECOWAS region countries are likely to experience positive consumer welfare 
and whether the net welfare gain will remain positive, depends both on whether the supplanted producers 
in the region experience welfare gains outweighing producer surplus losses. Th e overall welfare will also 
include the losses of tariﬀ  revenues for the Governments. 
Welfare eﬀ ects of liberalisation at the regional level, product analysis
Graph 13 displays the Harmonised System Chapters (HS02) yielding the highest welfare gains for the 
ECOWAS countries plus Mauritania. Together, these 6 products groups account for more than 65% of 
the total welfare gains of the region, in case of liberalization of the trade with the EU.
Graph 13: Product categories yeilding the largest consumer surplus in case of EPA
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Sources: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
By far, the group of products yielding the highest welfare gains are vehicles (28.41%), followed by rubbers 
and articles of rubbers (10.59%). 
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An approximate categorization41 of the products in 3 categories (manufactured, primary, and food 
products) shows the overwhelming importance of manufactured goods in the welfare gains (more than 
85%). Th e following tables shows the welfare changes for all products, by categories.
Table 23: Welfare changes in ECOWAS by categories of products
Types of goods Manufactured goods Primary products Food products
Welfare change in % 85.67% 8.36% 5.96%
Sources: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
It would be interesting to investigate further which social categories are bound to beneﬁ t most of such 
changes. Th is would imply reviewing the consumption baskets of diﬀ erent social categories according to 
revenue, and looking at the impact of the EPA on the tariﬀ  of these goods.
 For example, the modest decline in food products is bound to aﬀ ect in diﬀ erent ways the situation of the 
urban versus the rural poor, with the former probably beneﬁ ting more than the latter.
Conclusions from partial equilibrium simulations:
Our partial equilibrium simulations show that imports from the EU to ECOWAS would increase by 
approximately 1.87 billion US$. France and the UK would be the two main beneﬁ ciaries on the EU 
side, other studies have found similar results42. Nigeria and Ghana are projected to absorb the bulk (two-
thirds) of the increased imports from the EU.
In the case of ECOWAS, the trade diversion eﬀ ects seems relatively signiﬁ cant (-7%). Importantly, intra-
regional trade diversion is also notable (-6.7%), which shows a negative eﬀ ect on regional integration. 
Th e two principles of reciprocity and deeper regional integration are likely to pull in diﬀ erent directions. 
Th ere is therefore a case for diﬀ erentiation and less than full reciprocity in the EPA negotiations. 
Most of the intra-regional trade diversion occurs in Ghana, which shows that other ECOWAS 
countries will need to consult with this country to ensure that it times its opening to the EU imports 
in such a way as to grant enough time to ECOWAS ﬁ rms to adapt to increased competition on this 
market.
On the other hand, ECOWAS countries that would experience the largest fall in their exports to the 
rest of the region are Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and Benin. However, even for these countries the total level of 
41 Th e categorization is done at the HS-02 level.
42 See “Th e impact of ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreements on ECOWAS countries: an empirical analysis of the trade and budget eﬀ ects”, 
Busse, Borrmann and Grossmann, HWWA, Friedrich Ebert Institute, Hamburg 2004.
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exports remains only marginally aﬀ ected, due to the fact that most of their exports are geared towards 
developed countries markets. 
Petroleum products seem to be by far the most sensitive products to intra-regional trade diversion, 
followed by ﬁ sh, some textile and products of the milling industry. ECOWAS countries will have to 
consult intensively with these potential loosers to mitigate such potential negative impacts.
Although tariﬀ  revenue falls are highest in Nigeria in absolute ($) terms, the countries that will be the 
most aﬀ ected by them are Ghana and especially Guinea-Bissau, which could loose up to 20% of its 
Government budget revenues in case of a full liberalisation of EU imports.
Finally, our model shows some results, albeit incomplete concerning welfare gains. It seems that consumer 
surplus would mainly be improved through the lowering of price of industrial goods such as cars, machines 
and equipments.
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Conclusion
Th e purpose of this study has been to assess the economic impact of the economic partnership agreement 
between West African countries and the European Union. To that end, we have used two complementary 
methodological approaches, namely, the general equilibrium model, which is the ideal theoretical 
framework for this kind of assessment; and the partial equilibrium model, owing to the lack of data 
within the framework of the ﬁ rst approach.
Owing to this problem of lack of data, the general equilibrium analysis has been eﬀ ected by reference 
to aggregates such as sub-Saharan Africa. Th e partial equilibrium analysis, on the other hand, has been 
conducted by reference to the ECOWAS countries.
Th e EPAs negotiations framework, in our view, oﬀ ers several liberalization options. We have used three 
scenarios within a general equilibrium framework. Th e ﬁ rst has examined the implications of an EPA 
where sub-Saharan Africa applies the same preferential regime to the EU as that which it enjoys from 
the latter (full reciprocity). In the second scenario, we have assessed the impact for sub-Saharan Africa of 
deepened regional integration without immediate reciprocity to the preferences granted by the EU.  In 
this scenario, sub-Saharan African countries liberalize trade between them without immediate reciprocity 
to the EU. In the third scenario, we have examined the option of a free trade area (FTA) between sub-
Saharan Africa and the EU.
A number of observations emerge from this study. First, an analysis of the characteristics of African 
economies reveals their trade dependency and their vulnerability to external shocks.
When one looks at the protection structure of these countries vis-à-vis the EU, it appears that on average, 
the agro-processing industries and light manufactures are heavily protected. Th is may be attributed to the 
industrial policies of these countries. Another perspective on the high tariﬀ s on European products is to 
consider them as a source of revenue.
In the intra-African context, one may note the importance of trade barriers. No doubt, the deepening of 
regional integration may accentuate the fear of losing customs revenue. However, there is on the other 
hand a real potential for intra-African trade creation if these barriers were to be eliminated.
Th e results of the simulations show that the ﬁ rst scenario is clearly unfavourable to African countries. It 
emerges that with full reciprocity, the impact on sub-Saharan Africa will be negative in terms of GDP, 
balance of trade, terms of trade, as well as welfare. In respect to industrial structure, it is clear that for 
most of the SSA’s industries, their industrial production will decline under full reciprocity. Th e risk of 
de-industrialization is therefore important if the reciprocity principle is fully applied.
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Th e secnd scenario has positive consequences in respect of GDP and welfare.  Terms of trade will improve, 
but the trade balance remains in deﬁ cit.  Finally, the third scenario, which is the most ambitious in that it 
takes account of all the EU trade barriers, will entail the highest gains for sub-Saharan Africa (over $US 
8 billion in terms of welfare).  
However, these gains would be realized at the price of considerable and costly macroeconomic 
adjustments.  Indeed, the analytical tools used in assessing the impacts of the diﬀ erent scenarios do not 
really take account of the adjustment costs stemming from this kind of liberalization.  Th ese costs tend 
to rise proportionately the more ambitious the liberalization happens to be, because they are linked to 
reallocations of factors ﬂ owing from liberalization.  Th e implementation time frame for such agreements 
is also a key element for African countries, because it is a relevant consideration in regard to their capacity 
to handle the adjustment costs associated with such liberalization.
In order to gauge the magnitude of the variations in the main aggregates of total trade liberalization for 
the ECOWAS countries, we have analysed in partial equilibrium the impact of elimination of the duties 
applied by these countries on imports from the EU.  Th is simulation gives us an idea as to the magnitude 
of the adjustments the ECOWAS countries will face in the event of elimination of their trade barriers.
Th e ECOWAS countries are likely to register a substantial expansion in imports from the EU.  A 
considerable part of these imports will be deﬂ ected to the detriment of other trading partners, including 
indeed ECOWAS countries on occasion.  Even though it is still not of much consequence, this 
phenomenon does not augur well for greater regional integration.
Th e fact that intra-ECOWAS trade might be negatively directed is a question that should be seen as a 
high priority.  Th is region is among the least integrated on the continent.  Consequently, the principle 
of deeper integration needs to be placed at the fore, in relation to the reciprocity principle, in EPA 
negotiations for this region.
Finally, the positive gains realized by consumers in the ECOWAS area, as a result of the elimination of 
trade barriers, should be put in perspective, by reference both to the loss of domestic businesses crowded 
out of the market by new imports from more competitive European businesses, and the signiﬁ cant losses 
in customs revenue.  Given that these losses cannot be recouped instantly, the situation calls for concrete 
measures aimed at ensuring ﬁ scal sustainability.
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Annex 1
Table A: Regional aggregates (GTAP version 5)
Code GTAP regions
EU1 European Union Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, UK,  
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Rest of Central Europe 
BWA Botswana Botswana
XSC Rest of  SACU Namibia and South Africa
MOZ Mozambique Mozambique
MWI Malawi Malawi
TZA Tanzania Tanzania
ZMB Zambia Zambia
ZWE Zimbabwe Zimbabwe
UGA Uganda Uganda
XSF Rest of South Africa Other Southern Africa (Angola)
XSS Rest of  SSA Rest of SSA, incl. ECOWAS
ROW Other regions Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Rest of South Asia, Canada, 
United States of America, Mexico, Central America, Caribbean, 
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Rest of South America, Switzerland, 
Rest of EFTA, Former Soviet Union, Turkey, Rest of Middle East, 
Morocco, Rest of North Africa, Rest of World
Table B: Aggregates by sector (GTAP version 5)
Code Aggregate sector GTAP sector 
Cereals Grains Paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains  nec
Vegetables Vegetables and fruits Vegetables, fruits and nuts
Oilseeds Oilseeds Oilseeds 
Sugar Sugar Sugar cane, sugar beet
Cotton Cotton Plant-based fi bres
Other crops Other crops Crops nec
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Code Aggregate sector GTAP sector 
Livestock Animals and animal 
products
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses, animal products nec, 
untreated raw milk, wool, silk-worm cocoons 
Natural resources Natural resources Forestry, fi shing, coal, oil, gas, minerals nec
Agro-processing Agro-based industries Meat, cattle, sheep, goats, horse; meat products nec 
vegetable oils and fats, dairy products, processed rice, 
sugar, food products nec, beverages and tobacco products. 
Light manufacturing Light industries Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products, wood products, 
paper products, publishing.
Industry Industrial sectors Petroleum, coal products, mineral products nec, chemicals, 
rubber, plastics, ferrous metals, metals nec, metal 
products, motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment 
nec, electronic equipment, machinery and equipment nec, 
manufactures  nec.
Services Utility services Electricity, gas--extraction and distribution, water, 
construction, communication, fi nancial services nec, 
insurance, business services nec,  recreation and other 
services, dwellings, pub.admin/defence/health/education
Trade Trade facilitation Trade, sea transport, air transport. 
Source: Aggregations, GTAP Version 5 database
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Annex 2
Impacts of the diﬀ erent scenarios on the main aggregates (simulations in general equilibrium)
Table C $US million  
 GDP Imports   Exports Terms of trade BC      BE
Scenario 1 : full reciprocity
EU15 0.0044 0.1095 0.05 0.0565 52.7352 1748.8019
CEEC 0.0019 -0.01 0.0211 -0.0058 23.4368 -2.5357
NAM -0.0001 -0.0317 0.0207 -0.0103 529.9121 -83.1632
Japan -0.0005 -0.0574 0.0493 -0.0214 366.1649 -45.8012
SSA -0.0129 4.4775 2.3152 -0.5477 -1868.361 -563.9485
China -0.0018 -0.0671 -0.0115 -0.0282 45.5154 -57.3101
ROW -0.003 -0.0864 -0.0032 -0.0406 850.6011 -921.4965
Scenario 2 : Deeper intra-SSA integration without reciprocity  
EU15 -0.0004 -0.0082 0.0045 -0.0048 191.6676 -150.4622
CEEC -0.0005 -0.0043 0.0049 -0.0018 11.8501 -5.3033
 NAM 0 -0.0078 0.0092 -0.0042 150.7274 -58.1692
Japan -0.0001 -0.0106 0.0186 -0.0083 98.9025 -45.1652
SSA 0.4916 2.4112 1.2906 0.2996 -629.7655 1204.2651
China -0.0002 -0.0113 0.0016 -0.0056 15.5255 -16.4879
ROW -0.0002 -0.0045 0.0014 0.0024 161.0926 27.1114
Scenario 3: Free trade area 
EU15 0.0079 0.2245 0.2331 0.0194 934.9118 1116.3458
CEEC 0.0030 -0.0696 0.1245 -0.0829 169.0720 -131.7854
NAM -0.0003 -0.0780 0.0751 -0.0349 1437.1685 -438.9070
Japan -0.0013 -0.1163 0.1579 -0.0693 928.5612 -313.1068
SSA 3.3890 18.2476 8.8278 1.8336 -5484.2998 8028.7661
China -0.0032 -0.1236 0.0051 -0.0557 144.5395 -144.1505
ROW -0.0040 -0.1205 0.0072 -0.0327 1870.0596 -883.5765
Source:  ECA simulations, GTAP V.5.4
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Annex 3
Variations in production levels in SSA (%) under diﬀ erent EPA scenarios
Full reciprocity Deeper integration Free trade area
Cereals 0.0213 0.5554 7.7333
Vegetables -0.2063 0.2536 4.8533
Oilseeds -0.0199 0.2588 5.0238
Sugar 0.0423 0.4369 12.8798
Cotton 0.6788 -0.0293 -3.2957
Other crops 0.5084 -0.0616 0.9048
Livestock -0.2478 0.4614 5.5269
Pdts.Orig.Anim -0.0189 0.4063 4.9162
Fishing -0.1151 0.2612 3.4621
Energy 0.1458 -0.2934 -1.9289
Natural resource 0.2248 -0.1383 -1.7175
Processing 0.0885 0.4376 12.482
Textiles -0.6989 1.3384 2.3047
Clothing -2.6639 2.7493 9.1321
Low-tech.industry -4.8511 1.2875 -5.0218
Medium-tech.industry -3.0865 1.0426 -2.9961
Heavy industry -3.2136 1.2986 -10.7966
Source: ECA, simulations GTAP V.5.4
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WITS-SMART simulation results at the country level 
BENIN
Our simulations show that imports of Benin from the EU would rise by $US 61 million, that is, 9.72 per 
cent.  Exports from Benin to other West African countries would fall by more than $3.5 million in case 
of EPA, that is, about 12 per cent.  Th is amount would be about 11.6 per cent of the country’s exports 
to the region and about 0.016 per cent of its total exports.
Loss in exports to ECOWAS 
Th e table below shows the rates and amounts of export loss to West Africa.
Reduction in Benin’s exports to the rest of West Africa in case of EPA
Country
Reduction in Benin’s 
exports ($US ,000)
Rate of reduction of 
initial exports
Share of each market in the 
total export reduction
Ghana -3137.047 - 39.89% 88.89%
Nigeria -267.882 -1.37% 7.59%
Burkina Faso -23.909 -1.39% 0.68%
Côte d’Ivoire -100.156 -9.43% 2.84%
Total -3528.994 -11.66% 100.00%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Th e bulk of the decrease would be in Benin’s exports to Ghana (88 per cent).
It seems that while Benin’s exports to Burkina Faso and Nigeria would be a little aﬀ ected, those to Côte 
d’Ivoire and, especially Ghana, would be heavily aﬀ ected.
Vulnerable products
Products vulnerable to the deviation in Benin’s trade in case of EPA
Chapter SH 2 Description Reduction in revenues from 
exports to the region($US ,000)
% of overall 
reduction in exports
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and products 
of their distillation
-3159.138 89.52%
HS.38 Miscellaneous chemical 
products
-200.325 5.68%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
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Th e table above shows that the biggest export loss in monetary terms would be from mineral fuel and 
some chemical products, particularly reﬁ ned petroleum and herbicides (S.H-6).
It is also important to list those products whose export would be most aﬀ ected by the decrease. For 
certain tariﬀ  areas, some export products of Benin would be completely replaced by those from Europe, 
resulting in an export decline of 100 per cent for those products.  Th e products are:
•  Canned tomatoes; and Some textile products (cotton and synthetic materials).  
Fortunately, the export volumes of these products are currently very low and, therefore, they would have 
limited impact on the country’s economy43.
Loss of tariﬀ  revenues by product
For Benin, the simulations show that revenue loss across various categories of products is relatively evenly 
distributed (HS-2).
Chapter 
HS 2
Description Loss of tariff 
revenue
Share in overall 
revenue loss
Cumulative 
loss
HS.02  Meat and other meat products -8487.313 21.47% 21.47%
HS.63 Other ready-made textile materials -4665.415 11.80% 33.28%
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc. -2569.401 6.50% 39.78%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines, instruments 
and gadgets
-1816.777 4.60% 44.38%
HS.52 Cotton -1720.313 4.35% 48.73%
HS.04 Milk and milk products, eggs, and natural honey -1632.252 4.13% 52.86%
HS.20 Preparation of vegetables, fruits or other plant 
parts
-1411.586 3.57% 56.43%
HS.40 Rubber and rubber works -1314.982 3.33% 59.76%
HS.11 Products of the fl our industry; malt; starch, 
inulin…
-1164.884 2.95% 62.70%
HS.48 Papers and cardboard papers, art in cellulose 
paste
-1161.481 2.94% 65.64%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Meat and textiles account for a third of the total revenue loss.
43 More detailed information can be obtained from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
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BURKINA FASO
In case of EPA, Burkina Faso’s imports from the EU would increase by about $US 40 million, that is 
about 8 per cent, compared to current levels.  Th e country’s exports to other West African countries could 
experience an overall decline of more than $US 2 million, that is, a little more than 6 per cent of the 
country’s current exports to the region and about 0.008 per cent of its total exports. 
Th e table below shows the decline of Burkina Faso’s exports to West Africa in case of EPA.
Reduction in Burkina Faso’s exports to ECOWAS in case of EPA
Country Reduction in exports Millions of $US Reduction  in exports compared to initial level
Ghana -1914.556 -6.74%
Nigeria -10.631 -9.73%
Benin -4.073 -10.25%
Côte d’Ivoire -109.104 -2.14%
Average * -6.06%
Total -2038.364 *
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
According to the graph below, although the rate of reduction would be higher in Burkina Faso’s exports 
to Benin, most of the reduction in export volumes would actually occur in the country’s exports to 
Ghana.
Geographical distribution of Burkina Faso’s export loss in case of EPA
Ghana
Nigeria
Benin
Cote d’Ivoire
94%
5%
1%
0%
Source: simulations WITS-SMART, ECA
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Th is export situation can be explained by the fact that Burkina Faso enjoys preferential treatment in 
Benin under UEMOA, but the erosion of this preferential treatment, by EPA, would result in a high rate 
of reduction in Burkina Faso’s exports to Benin. 
Vulnerable products
Th e table below shows those products of Burkina Faso that are vulnerable, that is, those that would 
contribute most to the country’s overall export loss after EPA.
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Amount of   
export reduction
% of  overall 
export reduction
HS.04 Milk and dairy products, eggs, and natural honey -320.739 15.74%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines                                 
instruments and gadgets
-194.641 9.55%
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc. -188.064 9.23%
HS.24 Tobacco and manufactured substitutes -146.433 7.18%
HS.22 Drinks, liquid alcohol and vinegar -135.381 6.64%
HS.15 Fats, animal and vegetable oil; and their cleavage 
products
-130.919 6.42%
HS.19 Cereal-based preparations, fl our, starch Products, 
milk, pastries
-126.23 6.19%
HS.63 Other ready-made textile materials -91.923 4.51%
HS.40 Rubber and rubber products -87.777 4.31%
HS.20 Vegetable, fruit and other plant products -51.639 2.53%
HS.85 Electrical machinery, instruments, materials and
their spare parts, etc.  
-47.196 2.32%
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and products of their distillation -44.803 2.20%
HS.72 Smelting, iron and steel -39.107 1.92%
HS.73 Articles of cast, iron and steel -32.612 1.60%
HS.94 Household as well as medical and surgery                          
furniture, bedding materials
-30.76 1.51%
HS.69 Ceramics -28.255 1.39%
HS.59 Stuffed skins, covered objects, art and techniques in 
mat, textiles
-27.228 1.34%
HS.07 Edible vegetable plants, roots  and tubers -24.511 1.20%
HS.11 Products of the fl our industry, malt, starch  and inulin -22.982 1.13%
HS.30 Pharmaceuticals -22.565 1.11%
HS.38 Miscellaneous products of the chemical industry -21.152 1.04%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
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As shown, the distribution of the vulnerable products of Burkina Faso is even.  Th is means that a wide 
range of the country’s export products could be aﬀ ected by the reduction.
However, some products account for the overall reduction in exports. Th ese are, in particular, certain 
processed and semi-processed, agricultural products, namely:
Dairy products and eggs:  15.7 per cent;
Installations of boilers and mechanical instruments (S.H.84): 9.55 per cent;
Vehicles 9.23 per cent;
Tobacco products: 7.18 per cent;
Drinks: 6.64 per cent;
Animal fats: 6.42 per cent;
Flour- and cereal-based preparations: 6.19 per cent.
Th e fact that some of these products certainly have local inputs, particularly those products of the agro-
food industry, raises genuine concerns about the impact that the EPA would have on the rest of Burkina 
Faso’s economy, especially as regards the most disadvantaged social groups who work in the agricultural 
sector.
Loss of revenue by product
Burkina Faso could lose more than $22 million in tariﬀ  revenues if the EPA should take the form of a 
total liberalization. Th e table below gives a summary view of the loss in tariﬀ  revenue by product.
Burkina Faso: Loss of tariﬀ  revenue
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Loss of tariff 
revenue
($US ,000)
Share in overall 
loss of tariff 
revenue
Cumulative 
loss
HS.85  Electrical machinery, instruments, materials, 
and their spare parts, etc.  
-4603.578 20.92% 20.92%
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc. -2889.529 13.13% 34.05%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines                                
instruments and gadgets
-1996.601 9.07% 43.13%
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and products of their 
distillation
-1173.089 5.33% 48.46%
HS.21 Miscellaneous food preparations -1043.399 4.74% 53.20%
HS.72 Articles of cast, iron and steel -1016.509 4.62% 57.82%
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Chapter 
SH 2
Description Loss of tariff 
revenue
($US ,000)
Share in overall 
loss of tariff 
revenue
Cumulative 
loss
HS.17 Sugar and sugar confectionary -927.949 4.22% 62.04%
HS.73 Articles of cast, iron and steel -727.629 3.31% 65.34%
HS.11 Products of the fl our industry, malt, starches         
and inulin…
-580.612 2.64% 67.98%
HS.19 Cereal-based preparations, fl our, starch 
products, milk, pastries
-556.849 2.53% 70.51%
HS.90 Optical instruments gadgets and photography 
equipment, etc.
-525.985 2.39% 72.90%
HS.48 Papers and cardboard papers, art in cellulose 
paste
-442.188 2.01% 74.91%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
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CAPE VERDE
Since Cape Verde did not provide TRAINS with data, we could not assess the impact of EPA on the 
country’s imports and tariﬀ  revenue variation.
From our simulations based on data provided by ECOWAS member countries working with TRAINS, 
Cape Verde’s exports to the other ECOWAS countries could decrease by more than $US 347 000 in case 
of EPA.
According to the data used by WITS-SMART, Cape Verde’s exports to the other ECOWAS countries 
were only to Nigeria and Ghana.  Nigeria alone accounted for 99 per cent of these exports.
In percentage terms, Cape Verde’s export to the rest of the region would decrease by 12 per cent in case 
of EPA.  Th is would be higher than the average (about 9 per cent).
Vulnerable products
Th e table below shows the vulnerable products of Cape Verde in case of EPA.  Th ese products would be 
responsible for most of the overall reduction in Cape Verde’s revenue earnings from exports to ECOWAS 
countries in case of EPA.
Cape Verde’s products vulnerable to trade deviation in case of EPA 
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Export reduction
($US ,000)
Share in overall 
reduction in exports 
to the region
HS.69 Ceramic products -25.27 55.29%
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc. -5.323 11.65%
HS.94 Household as well as medical and surgery                          
furniture, bedding materials
-2.655 5.81%
HS.68 Art of stone, plaster, cement, etc… or similar materials -2.565 5.61%
HS.39 Plastics and plastic materials -2.082 4.56%
HS.38 Miscellaneous products of the chemical industry -2.016 4.41%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines                                 
instruments and gadgets
-1.581 3.46%
HS.83 Miscellaneous ordinary iron works -1.243 2.72%
HS.25 Salt, sulfur, soil and stones; plasters, lime and cement -0.719 1.57%
HS.40 Rubber and rubber products -0.656 1.44%
HS.96 Miscellaneous works -0.028 1.18%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
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Th e table shows that the reduction in export revenues would be caused mainly by the following 
products:
Ceramics:  55.29 per cent of the overall export reduction;
Vehicles:  11.65 per cent;
Furnishing and bedding materials: 5.81 per cent.
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COTE D’IVOIRE
Our simulations show that Côte d’Ivoire’s imports from the EU could increase by $US 188 million, that 
is, about 11.2 per cent.  It also seems that Côte d’Ivoire would lose almost $US 9 million, which is about 
0.19 per cent of its total exports to the whole world. Th e ECOWAS region’s share of this loss would be 
about 5 per cent of current levels.
Th e graph below shows the market distribution of this loss in the region 
Geographical distribution of the total reduction in Côte d’Ivoire’s exports in case of EPA
Ghana
Nigeria
Burkina Faso
Benin
47%
16%
22%
15%
0%
Mauritanie
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Ghana would account for about half (47 per cent) of Côte d’Ivoire’s trade reduction in case of EPA. 
Côte d’Ivoire’s export to Burkina Faso would also be considerable (22 per cent of the total decrease).  Th e 
shares of Nigeria and Benin in this decrease would be 16 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively.
Reduction in Côte d’Ivoire’s exports in case of EPA (rate and distribution of reduction)
Côte d’Ivoire to Export reduction($US ,000) % of export reduction % of overall reduction of exports
Ghana -4146.316 -26% 47%
Nigeria -1442.076 -9% 16%
Burkina Faso -1981.921 -2% 22%
Benin -1323.756 -3% 15%
Mauritania -17.319 -1% 0%
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Average -5% -
Total -8911.388 - -
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Th e table below shows the main products of Côte d’Ivoire that are vulnerable in case of EPA.  Th ese 
products are responsible for the lion share of the total reduction in exports to the rest of the region. 
Vulnerable products of Côte d’Ivoire in case of EPA
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Export reduction % of overall export 
reduction
HS.27 Mineral fuels, oils and products of their distillation -4922.876 55.24%
HS.52 Cotton -637.472 7.15%
HS.21 Miscellaneous food preparations -481.356 5.40%
HS.38 Miscellaneous products of the chemical industry -455.47 5.11%
HS.63 Other ready-made textile materials -280.706 3.15%
HS.39 Plastics and plastic products -225.67 2.53%
HS.17 Sugar and sugary confectionary -211.909 2.38%
HS.19 Cereal-based preparations, fl our, starch 
products, milk, pastries
-198.001 2.22%
HS.48 Papers and cardboard papers, art in cellulose 
paste
-149.141 1.67%
HS.24 Tobacco and manufactured substitutes -134.657 1.51%
HS.33 Essential oils and resin products. Perfumes -129.757 1.46%
HS.15 Fats, animal and vegetable oils; and their 
cleavage products...
-124.665 1.40%
HS.85 Electrical machinery, equipment and parts 
thereof
-123.792 1.39%
HS.34 Soaps, organic fl oor agents, washing and 
polishing preparations…
-96.172 1.08%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
It is clear that fuel and hydrocarbon products (55.24 per cent) have the larger share of the total reduction 
in exports.  Other products with a signiﬁ cant share of the total reduction of Côte d’Ivoire’s exports to the 
rest of the region are:
Cotton: 7.15 per cent;
Various types of food (HS.21):  5.4 per cent; and
Various chemical products: 5.1 per cent.
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Loss of tariﬀ  revenue by product
Côte d’Ivoire’s total loss of tariﬀ  revenue would be more than $US 112 million. Th e table below shows 
the products that would be responsible for the biggest loss of tariﬀ  revenue for Côte d’Ivoire. It can be 
seen from the table that the loss is evenly distributed among various sectors.
Categories of products responsible for the biggest loss of tariﬀ  revenue for Côte d’Ivoire
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Loss of tariff 
revenue
Share in overall loss 
of revenue
Cumulative 
loss
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other 
vehicles, etc..
-12688.691 11.31% 11.31%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines & 
mechanical appliances
-10461.665 9.32% 20.63%
HS.85 Electrical machinery, equipment and 
parts thereof
-7894.707 7.03% 27.66%
HS.03 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and 
other aquatic invertebrates
-7233.974 6.45% 34.11%
HS.48 Papers and cardboard papers, art in 
cellulose paste
-5900.259 5.26% 39.36%
HS.73 Articles of cast, iron and steel -4546.639 4.05% 43.41%
HS.27 Mineral fuels, oils and products of 
their distillation
-4137.952 3.69% 47.10%
HS.39 Plastics and plastic materials -3789.716 3.38% 50.48%
HS.22 Drinks, alcoholic liquid and vinegar -3429.591 3.06% 53.53%
HS.04 Milk and dairy products, eggs and 
natural honey
-2913.443 2.60% 56.13%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
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GAMBIA
Data for Gambia is not available from the TRAINS database. Th erefore we were not able to compute any 
simulation for Gambia neither on trade creation nor on revenue losses. Nevertheless it was possible to 
use other countries data to compute Gambia’s fall in exports to the rest of ECOWAS. According to our 
simulations using the WITS-SMART model, the decline in Gambia’s exports to the West-African region 
could amount to up to almost 32 000 US$, about 4.3% of current levels. 
Due to the heavy concentration of Gambia’s exports to ECOWAS, 80% of this fall would occur in export 
to Nigeria, which would decrease by 4.72%.
Fall in exports of Gambia after EPA (decline rate and repartition in ECOWAS).
Country Fall in export revenues, in 
US$ (‘000)
Variation of exports (%) Share in total export revenue 
loss
Ghana -4.142 -6.95% 13.00%
Nigeria -25.631 -4.72% 80.42%
Benin -2.012 -1.45% 6.31%
Mauritania -0.088 -10.15% 0.28%
Total -31.873 -4.30% 100.00%
Source: WITS-SMART: ECA
Th e table below shows the most vulnerable products for Gambia in case of an EPA. 
Th ese products are those that account for the largest shares of the total decline in exports to West Africa, 
due to trade diversion.
Vulnerable products for Gambia in case of EPA
Chapter
HS 2
Chapter description Fall in export 
revenue (US$ ‘000)
Variation of 
exports in %
Share in the overall 
export loss
HS.76 Aluminium and articles 
thereof.
-24.789 -4.64% 77.77%
HS.52 Cotton -1.804 -1.82% 5.66%
HS.63 
Total
Other made up textile 
articles; sets; worn clothing
-1.223 -32.68% 3.84%
HS.41 
Total
Raw hides and skins (other 
than fur skins) and lea
-1.208 -2.94% 3.79%
Source: WITS-SMART simulation, ECA.
Th e most vulnerable products are clearly “Aluminium and articles thereof”, which account for 77.4% of 
the total revenue fall.
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GHANA
In the case of Ghana, the year used for the simulation is 2000. Our simulation show a surge in imports 
of approximately 267 million US$, an increase of 13 %. Ghana could loose at least 1.2 million US $ in 
export to the rest of the region in case of EPA. Th is is equivalent to a loss of 4.7% or present exports to 
the region and only 0.0006% of Ghana’s export to the whole World in 2002.
In our sample, four West African countries reported imports from Ghana: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Mauritania and Nigeria. It is highly likely that there are actually exports from Ghana to other countries 
of the sub-region, at least to its two neighbours, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo, so our representation of Ghana’s 
export loss is probably under-estimated.
Ghana’s export loss in case of EPA (diminution by country in % and repartition of total export 
diminution)
Source : WITS-SMART simulation, ECA.
As indicated in the above table, the fall in export would be most severe in Benin (- 7.78% of present 
level). 
45.69% of the total downfall in export revenues would happen on Nigeria’s market. Benin, would also 
account for a large part of the total export forgone : 40%.
Vulnerable products:
Th e table on the following page represents the vulnerable products of Ghana, in case of an EPA with the 
EU. Th ese are the products that account for the largest share of Ghana’s export revenue reduction in case 
of EPA.
Th e list includes agriculture and agro-processed goods, as well as raw industrialised goods such as plastics 
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and consumable goods that are probably re-exported.
Exports of Cotton would represent a third of the total trade diversion for Ghana,
Boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances would represent 10% of these lost exports,
Miscellaneous edible preparations represent 7% of the loss, and
Plastics would represent more than 5.5% of the total loss of exports to the region.
Ghana: categories of products most aﬀ ected by regional trade diversion.
HS Chapter Product description Fall in export revenue 
(US$ ‘000)
% of total export 
revenue loss
HS.52 Cotton. -388.481 32.31%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & mech  
appliance;
-120.584 10.03%
HS.21 Miscellaneous edible preparations. -86.684 7.21%
HS.39 Plastics and articles thereof. -67.113 5.58%
HS.76 Aluminium and articles thereof. -42.951 3.57%
HS.37 Photographic or cinematographic goods. -39.949 3.32%
HS.48 Paper & paperboard; art of paper pulp,  
paper/pape
-38.833 3.23%
HS.27 Mineral fuels, oils & product of their  
distillation
-35.082 2.92%
HS.34 Soap, organic surface-active agents,  
washing prep
-34.174 2.84%
Source : WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
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GUINEA
Th e WITS-SMART model does not propose data for Guinea.  Th erefore, it was not possible for us to 
assess the impact of EPA on the imports, income or welfare of Guinea.  From our simulations based on 
the WITS-SMART model, Guinea could lose $US 114 000 in exports to the rest of ECOWAS, a little 
less than 8 per cent of the country’s current exports to the region. 
Th e value of Guinea’s world exports would increase to about $US 700 million in 200244, and the loss in 
export would be 0.02 per cent in case of EPA.
Reduction in Guinea’s exports to the rest of the region in case of EPA (rate and geographical 
distribution of reduction)  
Country Decrease in exports
($US ,000)
Rate of export 
Reduction by country
% of overall export
reduction
Ghana -1.389 -19.40% 1.21%
Nigeria -104.551 -7.49% 91.12%
Burkina Faso -4.148 -9.59% 3.62%
Benin -0.703 -11.82% 0.61%
Côte d’Ivoire -3.931 -16.45% 3.43%
Mauritania -0.012 -3.76% 0.01%
Total -114.734 -7.77% 100.00%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Exports to Nigeria would be responsible for the bulk of this decrease (91.12 per cent of the total decrease). 
Th is is relatively due to the larger volumes of Guinea’s exports going to Nigeria, compared to other 
countries of the region. 
In terms of proportion, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire would have the largest shares in the export decrease 
(19.40 per cent and 16.45 per cent, respectively).
Vulnerable products
Th e table that follows shows those products whose export to the rest of the region, is most likely to 
decrease in case of EPA with the EU. 
Th e products of Guinea most vulnerable to the trade deviation are:
44 Source:  World Bank, African Development Indicators
84
(a) Vehicles:  -$US 38627;
(b) Fish and crustaceans: -$US 26929; 
(c) Leather products, paints (chapter 32 of the S.H):  -$US 24543;
(d) Various food items:  -$US11276.
Products of Guinea vulnerable to trade loss in case of EPA
Chapter
SH 2
Description Variation in export 
revenues
($US ,000)
% of overall loss  
of export revenue
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc. -38.627 33.67%
HS.03 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates 
-26.929 23.47%
HS.32 Tanned or dyed extracts; tannins and their 
derivatives, pigments, etc
-24.543 21.39%
HS.21 Miscellaneous food preparations -11.276 9.83%
HS.23 Wastes from food industries; animal feeds -5.875 5.12%
HS.40 Rubber and rubber works -1.957 1.71%
HS.16 Preparations of meat/fi sh/crustaceans/ 
molluscs, etc
-1.449 1.26%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
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GUINEA-BISSAU
Our simulations show that Guinea-Bissau’s imports from the EU could increase by $US 10 million, that 
is, more than 16 per cent.  Th e country would lose up to $20 000 worth of exports to the West African 
region.
Th is amount is a little more than 3 per cent of Guinea-Bissau’s current exports and 0.0405 per cent of 
the country’s exports to the World.
Of the countries named in Wits-Smart’s data only Nigeria stated its imports from Guinea-Bissau.
Th e table below shows the major export-based products of Guinea Bissau likely to be replaced by European 
products in case of EPA.
Vulnerable products of Guinea-Bissau in case of EPA
Chapter
SH 2
Description Variation in export 
revenues ($US ,000)
% of overall loss of 
export revenue
HS.03 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates
-13.808 66.81%
HS.48 Papers and cardboard papers, art in 
cellulose paste
-5.348 25.88%
HS.69 Ceramics -1.013 4.90%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines & 
mechanical appliances
-0.291 1.41%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Th e products that would be most threatened by the trade deviation are ﬁ sh products.  Th ey account for 
two thirds of the total export revenue loss.
Paper and paper products would also be highly threatened as they are responsible for more than a quarter 
of the loss in exports to the rest of the region.  
Loss of tariﬀ  revenue  
As shown in the report, Guinea-Bissau seems to be our sample country with the biggest revenue loss. 
Th e table below shows the 10 categories of products (HS-2) with the biggest loss in ﬁ nancial revenue.
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Guinea-Bissau: Th e 10 categories of products (HS-2) with the biggest revenue loss
Chapter
SH 2
Description Variation in 
export revenue
($US ,000)
% of overall 
export revenue 
loss
Cumulative 
loss
HS.22  Drinks, alcoholic liquid and vinegar -1157.879 16.15% 16.15%
HS.68  Art of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, or 
similar materials
-665.143 9.28% 25.42%
HS.87  Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc. -646.946 9.02% 34.45%
HS.11  Products of the fl our industry, malt; starch, 
inulin…
-619.903 8.65% 43.09%
HS.27 Mineral fuels, oils and products of their 
distillation
-596.238 8.32% 51.41%
HS.15 Animal/plant fats & oils & their cleavage 
products...
-433.381 6.04% 57.45%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines & 
mechanical appliances
-330.689 4.61% 62.06%
HS.85  Electrical machinery, equipment and parts 
thereof
-209.128 2.92% 64.98%
HS.94  Building and hospital furniture:  bedding, 
mattresses
-199.791 2.79% 67.76%
HS.21 Miscellaneous food preparations -198.461 2.77% 70.53%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Th e revenue loss is relatively evenly distributed and the products most aﬀ ected are processed products, 
including food products. A more subtle analysis concerning S.H. 6 shows that in some chapters the 
revenue loss is conﬁ ned to certain items. For example, in S.H. 6, there are big losses on drinks such as 
beer and wine.  Diesel cars, certain cement works, wheat ﬂ ower, soya oils and various machines-appliances 
such as deep-freezers, or workshop machines (chapter 84) also suﬀ er considerable losses45.
45 For more detail, consult the Trade and Regional Integration Division of the Economic Commission for Africa.
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LIBERIA
Th e WITS-SMART database does not have information for Liberia. Th erefore we could not evaluate the 
impact of an EPA for Liberia’s tariﬀ  revenue, imports or welfare.
Using mirror data, we showed that Liberia could loose at least US$ 126 459 of revenues of exports to 
West Africa, under an EPA with the EU. Th is is 15% of present exports to the region.
Only three countries of the region – Benin, Ghana and Nigeria- have reported exports from Liberia in 
our simulation. As Sierra Leone and Guinea- two neighbours of Liberia – have not provided data to 
WITS-SMART, it is highly likely that our results underestimate the potential export loss for Liberia.
As shown in the table below, Liberia’s exports to Nigeria are those that would take the hardest hits, they 
would decline by more than 19% of their present level, and they would account for more than 80% of 
the forgone export revenue.
Loss in exports for Liberia under an EPA with full liberalisation of EU imports.
Source : WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
On the other hand, the loss in exports to Benin would be much more modest.
Our simulations show that the two most vulnerable categories of products are industrialized goods that 
are probably re-exported from Liberia : vehicles and electrical machinery.
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Liberia: products undergoing strong trade diversion to ECOWAS
Product Description Exports 
before EPA 
(‘000$)
Variation in 
exports ($ 
‘000)
Variation 
in exports 
in %
Share in 
overall 
export’s 
loss
Cumulated 
loss
HS.87 Vehicles o/t railw/tramw roll-
stock, pts  & access
324.109 -74.865 -23.10% 59.2% 59.2%
HS.85 Electrical mchy equip parts 
thereof;  sound record
234.914 -24.73 -10.53% 19.6% 78.8%
HS.70 Glass and glassware. 83.278 -6.117 -7.35% 4.8% 83.6%
HS.55 Man-made staple fi bres. 3.758 -2.648 -70.46% 2.1% 85.7%
Source : WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
Th ese two categories of products would represent more than three quarter of the total reduction in export 
revenue for Liberia. Other products that could experience some reduction in exports to the rest of the 
region include mainly manufactured intermediate goods.
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MALI
Our simulations show that Mali’s imports from the EU could increase by more than $US 54 million, that 
is, an increase of over 14 per cent.  Income from exports to the rest of the region could fall by more than 
$US 475 000, a decrease of about 13 per cent of current exports.
West African countries that reported imports from Mali are Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritania 
and Nigeria. 
As shown by the table below, Ghana would account for more than 90 per cent of Mali’s export reduction. 
Th ree quarters of Mali’s current exports go to Ghana. However, Benin seems to be the country where 
Mali’s export loss (more than 18 per cent) would be deepest, compared to the initial levels.  In contrast, 
only 3 per cent of Mali’s exports to Burkina Faso would be aﬀ ected.
Reduction in Mali’s exports to the rest of West Africa after ECOWAS has fully opened up to EU 
exports
Country Current exports ($US 
,000)
Reduction in exports 
after EPA ($US ,000)
% of export 
reduction
% share in total 
reduction of exports
Ghana 2748.932 -429,828 -15.64% 90.44%
Nigeria 197.743 -24.752 -12.52% 5.21%
Burkina Faso 578.01 -19.851 -3.43% 4.18%
Benin 0.917 -0.167 -18.21% 0.04%
Mauritania 14.462 -0.67 -4.63% 0.14%
Total 3540.064 -475.268 -13.43% 100.00%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Vulnerable products
Th e table in the following page shows the categories of Mali’s products most vulnerable in case of EPA. 
Th ese products would be responsible for much of the decrease in export revenues after the markets have 
been opened up to European products.
Fuel and other petroleum products would be responsible for more than three quarters of Mali’s export 
revenue loss. Various food preparations would also suﬀ er a loss of more than $US 24 000 dollars, that is, 
about 5.15 per cent of the total export reduction.
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Mali: categories of products whose export to the rest of the region would fall in case of EPA
Chapter
SH  2
Description Exports 
before EPA
Export variations 
($US ,000  )
% of  export 
variations
Share in overall 
export loss
HS.27 Mineral fuels, oils and 
products of their distillation 
905.962 -369.434 -40.78% 77.73%
HS.21 Various food preparations 88.106 -24.499 -27.81% 5.15%
HS.90 Optical instruments, 
appliances, photographic 
instruments etc.
139.62 -13.842 -9.91% 2.91%
Grand 
Total
3540.064 -475.268 -13.43% 100.00%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Tariﬀ  revenue loss
Th e distribution of export revenue loss across the various categories of imports is fairly even.  However, 
the table below shows that 10 categories of products out of 97 account for 70 per cent of the revenue 
loss.
Mali: loss of tariﬀ  revenue by product
Chapter
SH2
Category of product Tariff revenue 
variation 
($US ,000)
Share in 
overall 
revenue loss
Cumulative 
loss
HS.52 Cotton -6449.38 19.46% 19.46%
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc. -4494.457 13.56% 33.02%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances
-3400.056 10.26% 43.28%
HS.85 Electrical machinery; equipment parts thereof; 
sound record
-2731.371 8.24% 51.52%
HS.11 Products of the fl our industry; malt; starch 
inulin…
-1978.006 5.97% 57.49%
HS.38 Miscellaneous chemical products -863.054 2.60% 60.09%
HS.19 Preparations of cereal, fl our, starch/milk; pastries -859.841 2.59% 62.69%
HS.17 Sugar and sugary confectionery -811.584 2.45% 65.14%
HS.73 Articles of cast, iron or steel -722.726 2.18% 67.32%
HS.04 Milk and dairy products, eggs and natural honey -720.555 2.17% 69.49%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
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In the table, there is a predominance of manufactured and food products. A more subtle analysis at 
the S.H. 6 level shows this for chapter 52, under the paragraph on other bleached cotton materials 
containing at least 85 per cent of cotton with a maximum weight of 200g/m2.  Chapter 84 contains 
various machinery-appliances.
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MAURITANIA
Based on our simulations, Mauritania’s imports from the EU could increase by more than $US 28 
million, that is, about 8 per cent. But the country could lose $US 1.6 million in exports to ECOWAS 
in case of EPA with the EU. Th is amount is about 3.12 per cent of Mauritania’s current exports to West 
Africa, and 0.005 per cent of its exports to the whole world.
Th e table below shows that almost all of Mauritania’s export revenue loss (98.6 per cent) would be from 
its exports to Nigeria.
Reduction in Mauritania’s exports to the rest of West Africa and the geographical distribution
Country Exports to ECOWAS 
prior to EPA ($US ,000)
Loss in exports to ECOWAS 
after EPA ($US ,000)
Export loss as % of 
initial levels
Share in overall 
revenue loss
Nigeria 50,458.76 -1,630.63 -3.23% 98.56%
Burkina Faso 136.52 -0.40 -0.29% 0.02%
Benin 2,434.69 -23.48 -0.96% 1.42%
Total 53,029.97 -1,654.51 -3.12% 100.00%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Vulnerable products
As can be seen from the table below, ﬁ sh and crustaceans would account for almost all the reduction in 
exports.
vulnerable products for Mauritania
Chapter SH 2 Description Reduction in exports to 
the region ($US ,000)
% of export revenue 
loss
HS.03 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and 
other aquatic invertebrates
-1573.891 97.25%
HS.31 Fertilizers -44.511 2.75%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
As stated earlier on, almost all these products are exported to Nigeria.
Loss of tariﬀ  revenue
Mauritania could lose more than $US 14 million in customs revenues.
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Th e 10 categories of products (chapters of the harmonized system) which could seriously reduce 
Mauritania’s customs revenues are shown in the table below.
 Mauritania: 10 categories of products responsible for the biggest customs revenue loss
Chapter
SH 2
Description Loss of tariff 
revenue ($US ,000)
% of share in 
overall loss
% of 
cumulative loss
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, 
etc.
-2693.068 18.48% 18.48%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances
-2552.975 17.52% 36.00%
HS.73 Articles of cast, iron or steel -1309.088 8.98% 44.98%
HS.85 Electrical machinery; equipment parts 
thereof; sound record, etc.
-799.753 5.49% 50.47%
HS.11 Products of the fl our industry; malt; 
starch inulin.
-753.287 5.17% 55.64%
HS.17 Sugar and sugary confectionery -644.721 4.42% 60.06%
HS.15 Animal/plant fats & oils & their cleavage 
products
-608.398 4.17% 64.24%
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and products of their 
distillation 
-566.906 3.89% 68.13%
HS.40 Rubber and rubber works -453.353 3.11% 71.24%
HS.04 Milk and dairy products, eggs and natural 
honey
-361.954 2.48% 73.72%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
It should be noted that these products are made up mainly of manufactured products and basic food 
products such as sugar, ﬂ our and dairy products.
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NIGER
It can be seen from our simulations that the Niger’s imports from the EU would increase by about $US 
40 million, or 19 per cent. Th e Niger could also lose almost $US 2.4 million dollars in case of an EPA 
with the EU. Th is loss would be equal to 8.7 per cent of the country’s current exports to the rest of West 
Africa, and 0.008 per cent of its total exports.
Th e table below shows that about 70 per cent of the export reduction would occur in the Niger’s exports 
to the Ghanaian market. Côte d’Ivoire’s market would account for more than one quarter of the loss. 
However, the deepest fall in exports compared to current levels would be in the Niger’s exports to Nigeria 
(fall of –18.72 per cent) while the smallest fall would be in its exports to Burkina Faso (less than –3 per 
cent).
Reduction in the Niger’s exports to the region and geographical distribution
Country Exports to the region 
prior to EPA ($US 
,000)
Export reduction 
after EPA
($US ,000)
% of export 
reduction
Geographical 
distribution of 
export reduction
Ghana 20,340.81 -1,664.29 -8.18% 69.79%
Côte d’Ivoire 6,417.25 -628.44 -9.79% 26.35%
Nigeria 462.98 -86.68 -18.72% 3.63%
Burkina Faso 175.74 -5.22 -2.97% 0.22%
Benin 0.17 -0.01 -7.83% 0.00%
Total 27,396.94 -2,384.65 -8.70% 100.00%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Vulnerable products
Th e products of the Niger most vulnerable in case of an EPA with the EU are given in the page that 
follows.  Th ese products are responsible for the country’s biggest export revenue losses.
Prominent among these products are:
Products of the ﬂ our trade industry: -$US 600 000;
Edible vegetable: -$US 438 000;
Dairy products and eggs: -$US 374 000; and
Sugar and sugary confectionery: -$US 134 976.
Th is list contains numerous agricultural and agro-food products, a fact that raises concerns that there 
might be a negative impact on the other sectors of the Niger’s economy, particularly for the poorest social 
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groups whose income come from rural activities.
Th e 10 categories of products (HS-2) whose export to the rest of the region could be most aﬀ ected 
by the reduction ($US)
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Exports  prior to 
EPA($US ,000)
Export variation
($US ,000)
% of export 
variation
% of share in 
overall export loss
HS.11 Products of the fl our 
industry, malt, starch and 
inulin…
2908.61 -612.153 -21.0% 25.67%
HS.07 Edible vegetable plants, 
roots and tubers 
3021.966 -439.345 -14.5% 18.42%
HS.04 Milk and dairy products, 
eggs, and natural honey
1218.358 -374.01 -30.7% 15.68%
HS.17 Sugar and sugary 
confectionary
5009.633 -151.296 -3.0% 6.34%
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and 
other vehicles, etc.             
                          
714.489 -96.673 -13.5% 4.05%
HS.52 Cotton 2,553.41 -92.353 -3.6% 3.87%
HS.28 Inorganic chemical 
products; inorg/organ 
compounds.  Precious 
metals …
1327.036 -92.007 -6.9% 3.86%
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and 
products of their distillation 
910.821 -87.978 -9.7% 3.69%
HS.20 Vegetables, fruits and 
other plant preparations
321.304 -66.176 -20.6% 2.78%
HS.19 Cereal-based reparations, 
fl our, starch products, milk, 
pastries
669.394 -51.033 -7.6% 2.14%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Loss of tariﬀ  revenue
Th e Niger could lose more than $US 20 million in import revenues. Th e share of vehicles in the overall 
loss is huge (almost half ). Machinery and appliances (chapter 84) also account for about 10 per cent of 
the overall loss.
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Niger: Main categories of products responsible for the loss of tariﬀ  revenues
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Tariff revenue loss
($US ,000)
% share in 
overall loss
% of cumulative 
loss
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc.. -9937.021 48.50% 48.50%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines                                 
instruments and gadgets
-1993.949 9.73% 58.24%
HS.63 Other ready-made textile materials -1018.836 4.97% 63.21%
HS.11  Products of the fl our industry; malt; starch, 
inuli…
-957.136 4.67% 67.88%
HS.85 Electrical machines, instruments, materials, 
their spare parts, etc.  
-932.465 4.55% 72.43%
HS.73 Articles of cast, iron and steel -738.847 3.61% 76.04%
HS.17 Sugar and sugary confectionery -417.293 2.04% 78.08%
HS.90 Optical instruments, appliances, photographic 
instruments etc..
-325.696 1.59% 79.67%
HS.20 Vegetables, fruits and other plant preparations -320.866 1.57% 81.23%
HS.39 Plastics and plastic materials -318.211 1.55% 82.78%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
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NIGERIA
According to our simulations, Nigeria would see imports from the EU increase by more than 617 million 
US$, an increase of 11%. Nigeria could also loose at least 1.9 million dollars of export revenues to the 
rest of the region. Th is amount is equivalent to about 4.7% of current exports to West Africa, and about 
0.00012 % of Nigeria’s total exports to the World.
In our database, only three countries of the sub-region declared imports from Nigeria : Benin, Burkina 
Faso and Ghana. Th e table below represents the diminution of exports to ECOWAS, under an EPA. 
Although only about 21 % of Nigeria’s exports go to Ghana today, it would be on this market that 
Nigerian exporters would experience their greatest losses.
Exports to Ghana would decrease by about 15%, and about 70 % of the total exports forgone would be 
on that market, under an EPA.
Nigeria : fall in export under an EPA and repartition in West Africa.
Source : WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
In comparison, it appears that Nigeria’s exports to Benin and Burkina Faso would be less aﬀ ected.
Vulnerable products :
Th e table on the next page shows the vulnerable products for Nigeria in case of total liberalisation of EU 
imports into ECOWAS (our scenario in this report). Th e categories of products listed here are those that 
would account for the largest part of the total loss in export revenues for Nigeria’s exporters.
It appears that the most vulnerable products would be fuel and oil products, which would account for 
more than 46% of the total loss in export revenues.
Th e other main vulnerable products are manufactured goods such as textile (HS. 63), and vehicles (HS 87). 
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Finally, for a country the size of Nigeria, and given its geographical location, it would be interesting to 
analyse the trade diversion impacts of EPAs between the EU and other RECs, especially in neighbouring 
CEMAC.
Nigeria: product categories experiencing the highest trade diversion in ECOWAS
Chapter 
HS
Product description Variation of exports to 
ECOWAS (US$ ‘000)
Share of the total reduction in 
export revenues to ECOWAS
HS.27 Mineral fuels, oils & product of their  
distillation
-877.235 46.41%
HS.63 Other made up textile articles; sets;  
worn clothing
-188.655 9.98%
HS.87 Vehicles o/t railw/tramw roll-stock, 
pts  & access
-99.926 5.29%
HS.85 Electrical mchy equip parts thereof;  
sound record
-60.511 3.20%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & 
mech  appliance;
-44.346 2.35%
HS.83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal. -43.495 2.30%
HS.94 Furniture; bedding, mattress, matt  
support, cushion
-39.59 2.09%
HS.48 Paper & paperboard; art of paper 
pulp,  paper/pape
-38.951 2.06%
HS.68 Art of stone, plaster, cement, 
asbestos,  mica/sim
-38.665 2.05%
HS.52 Cotton. -37.341 1.98%
HS.28 Inorgn chem; compds of prec mtl,  
radioact element
-37.279 1.97%
HS.70 Glass and glassware. -36.616 1.94%
HS.39 Plastics and articles thereof. -33.138 1.75%
HS.15 Animal/veg fats & oils & their 
cleavage  products;
-31.904 1.69%
HS.73 Articles of iron or steel. -31.738 1.68%
HS.19 Prep.of cereal, fl our, starch/milk;  
pastrycooks’
-29.201 1.54%
HS.76 Aluminium and articles thereof. -26.168 1.38%
HS.72 Iron and steel. -24.99 1.32%
HS.19 Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts or other 
parts of
-18.72 0.99%
Sources: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
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Tariﬀ  revenue losses:
Th e loss of tariﬀ  revenue would amount to almost 427 millions US$ for Nigeria.
Th e table below shows the 10 categories of products (HS-2) that would incur the largest falls in tariﬀ  
revenue. 
Nigeria: 10 product categories for which the tariﬀ  revenue fall is largest
Product category (HS-2) Loss in tariff 
revenue (‘000 US$)
Share in total tariff 
revenue loss
Cumulated tariff 
revenue loss
HS.85  Electrical mchy equip parts 
thereof;  sound record Total
-55164.975 12.92% 12.92%
HS.84  Nuclear reactors, boilers, 
mchy & mech  appliance; Total
-54297.004 12.72% 25.64%
HS.87  Vehicles o/t railw/tramw 
roll-stock, pts  & access Total
-51560.848 12.08% 37.72%
HS.21  Miscellaneous edible 
preparations. Total
-26905.599 6.30% 44.02%
HS.24  Tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes Total
-23381.341 5.48% 49.50%
HS.73  Articles of iron or steel. 
Total
-19925.526 4.67% 54.17%
HS.30  Pharmaceutical products. 
Total
-19028.424 4.46% 58.62%
HS.72  Iron and steel. Total -13395.902 3.14% 61.76%
HS.27  Mineral fuels, oils & 
product of their  distillation Total
-12446.423 2.92% 64.68%
HS.17  Sugars and sugar 
confectionery. Total
-11287.62 2.64% 67.32%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
One can observe that the tariﬀ  revenue loss will be the largest for manufactured goods such as electrical 
machinery (chapter 85), machines and mechanical appliances (chapter 84) vehicles (chapter 87). Some 
food products may also cause some large tariﬀ  revenue losses (edible preparations, tobacco, sugar).
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SENEGAL
Our simulations show that Senegal’s imports from the EU would rise by $US 144 million, or 12 per 
cent, but Senegal could also lose more than $US 1.6 million in exports to West Africa.  Th is amount is 
about 2.85 per cent of the country’s current exports to the region and about 0.0015 per cent of its total 
exports.
Th e table that follows shows the reduction in Senegal’s exports in case of EPA, and the distribution of 
this across the region.
Trade diversion to the disadvantage of Senegal: export loss and geographical distribution
Country Current exports
($US ,000)
Reduction in exports after 
EPA($US ,000)
% of reduction
in exports
Geographical distribution
Of total reduction in exports
Ghana 6,895.93 -139.14 -2.02% 8.51%
Nigeria 487.12 -21.90 -4.50% 1.34%
Benin 20,962.59 -413.39 -1.97% 25.28%
Côte d’Ivoire 25,894.52 -831.73 -3.21% 50.86%
Mauritania 3,080.70 -229.27 -7.44% 14.02%
Total 57,320.86 -1,635.43 -2.85% 100.00%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Th e fall in Senegal’s exports to the subregion is almost evenly distributed, except for Mauritania where 
the fall is slightly sharp (-7.44 per cent).
Half of Senegal’s export loss would come from its exports to Côte d’Ivoire, and about a quarter from its 
exports to Benin.
Vulnerable products
Th e table below indicates the categories of products most vulnerable to trade deviation in case of an EPA.
Unlike many other countries of the region, the loss in Senegal’s export revenues seem to be relatively 
evenly distributed among various categories of products. No product accounts for more than 12 per cent 
of the total export loss.
Th e main products aﬀ ected are, ﬁ rst and foremost, manufactured products or semi manufactured products 
like plastics, iron and steel articles, essential oils and fertilizer. Th e export of tobacco and fuel could also 
be seriously aﬀ ected (-12 and –8,8 per cent, respectively).
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It is therefore feared that, to some extent, EPA might run to counter Senegal’s economic diversiﬁ cation 
and industrialization objectives.  It can only be hoped that Senegal’s exporters could make the best of the 
new opportunities to export to the EU, thus, on the whole, bring the beneﬁ ts of EPA to the country.
Senegal: Categories of products vulnerable to trade diversion in case of EPA
Chapter
SH 2
Description Variation in exports
($US ,000)
Share in total export 
revenue loss
HS.24 Tobacco and manufactured substitutes -197.33 12.07%
HS.39 Plastics and plastic materials -155.524 9.51%
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and products                      
 of their distillation                       
-144.145 8.81%
HS.31 Fertilizers -142.489 8.71%
HS.85 Electrical machines, instruments, materials, 
their spare parts, etc.  
-142.388 8.71%
HS.73 Articles of cast, iron or steel -125.817 7.69%
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, 
etc.
-124.986 7.64%
HS.33 Essential oils and resin products. Perfumes -83.953 5.13%
HS.34 Soaps, organic fl oor agents, washing and 
polishing preparations
-70.409 4.31%
HS.38 Miscellaneous chemical products -49.715 3.04%
Source:  WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Loss of tariﬀ  revenue
We estimate that the total loss of customs revenues, in the case of Senegal, could exceed $US 80 million. 
Th is loss is relatively well distributed across the various categories of products, even though it can be 
seen from the table that 10 of the 97 harmonized system’s chapters account for 60 per cent of the total 
revenue loss.
Senegal: loss of customs revenue by main product category
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Variation in tariff 
revenue ($US  ,000)
Share in overall 
tariff loss revenue
Cumulative 
loss
HS.87 Cars, tractors, cycles and other 
vehicles, etc…
-10562.021 13.17% 13.17%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines 
instruments and gadgets
-9454.783 11.79% 24.96%
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Chapter 
SH 2
Description Variation in tariff 
revenue ($US  ,000)
Share in overall 
tariff loss revenue
Cumulative 
loss
HS.85 Electrical machines, instruments, 
materials; their spare parts, etc
-6645.46 8.29% 33.24%
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and products of 
their distillation
-5827.246 7.27% 40.51%
HS.73 Articles of cast, iron and steel -2831.001 3.53% 44.04%
HS.39 Plastics and plastic materials -2768.704 3.45% 47.49%
HS.04 Milk and dairy products, eggs, and 
natural honey
-2702.216 3.37% 50.86%
HS.94 Household as well as medical and 
surgery furniture, bedding materials
-2554.213 3.18% 54.04%
HS.15 Animal/plant fats & oils & their 
cleavage products...
-2377.277 2.96% 57.01%
HS.48 Papers and cardboard papers, art 
in cellulose paste
-2302.761 2.87% 59.88%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Here, there is big contribution from manufactured products such as vehicles (chapter 87), machinery 
(chapter 84), electrical appliances (chapter 85), fuels (chapter 27) as well as some food products to the 
potential reduction in customs revenue.
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SIERRA LEONE
Data for Sierra-Leone is not available in the WITS-SMART model. Consequently, we were not able to 
evaluate the impact of the EPA on tariﬀ  revenue, level of imports from the EU and consumer surplus. 
However, we were able to use mirror data to evaluate the impact of the EPA on Sierra Leone’s exports to 
the rest of the ECOWAS. According to our simulations Sierra Leone’s exports to Western Africa after the 
EPA would fall by 22,000 US$, which amounts to about 5% of current level. 
In our database, only three countries declared imports from Sierra Leone : Benin, Ghana and Nigeria. 
As displayed in the table below, the fall in exports would mostly take place in Ghana, which is already the 
main regional importer of Sierra Leone’s goods.
Sierra Leone : fall in exports under an EPA and its repartition in the region
Source : WITS-SMART simulations, ECA.
Th us, exports to Ghana would go down by 23.33%, and this would represent over 78% of Sierra Leone’s 
total decline in exports to ECOWAS.
Vulnerable products :
As is shown on the table below, most of the decline in export revenues (77%) is to be expected from 
tobacco products, in the case of Sierra Leone. Preparation of vegetables, fruits and nuts (HS 20) could 
also see their exports to fall by 11.8% under an EPA.
Th ere might be negative repercussions from the fall in exports from these categories of products, especially 
if they are products transformed from national agricultural inputs. Th e fall in export revenue might be 
transmitted to national agricultural producers.
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Sierra Leone: product categories incurring the largest fall in exports to ECOWAS
H.S. 
Chapter Description
Change In export 
revenues ($ ‘000)
Share of total 
export loss Cumulated loss
HS.24  Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes -17.138 77.31% 77.31%
HS.20  Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts or other  parts of -2.625 11.84% 89.15%
HS.85  Electrical mchy equip parts thereof;  sound record -1.007 4.54% 93.69%
HS.87  Vehicles o/t railw/tramw roll-stock, pts  & access -0.432 1.95% 95.64%
HS.39  Plastics and articles thereof. -0.257 1.16% 96.80%
Source: WITS-SMART simulation, ECA.
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TOGO
According to our simulations, Togo’s imports from the EU could increase by more than $US 58 million, 
or about 11.5 per cent higher than current levels.  We therefore found from our studies that the fall in 
Togo’s exports to West Africa could be the biggest, possibly exceeding $US 11.4 million.  Th is reduction 
is about 16.2 per cent of Togo’s current exports to the region and 0.03 per cent of its overall exports.
As can be seen from the table below, much of Togo’s total loss (93 per cent) would come from its export 
to Ghana, its neighbouring country.  Togo’s export to Ghana would decrease by more than 23 per cent.
Togo’s loss of exports to ECOWAS in case of EPA (% of loss, and distribution by country)
Regional 
importer
Exports prior to 
EPA ($US ,000)
Variation in exports 
after EPA ($US ,000)
% of export 
variation
Share in overall export 
reduction
Ghana 46088.666 -10694.881 -23.2% 93.0%
Burkina Faso 18886.918 -474.576 -2.5% 4.1%
Côte d’Ivoire 1445.693 -98.616 -6.8% 0.9%
Mauritania 2.918 -0.461 -15.8% 0.0%
Nigeria 4480.273 -229.459 -5.1% 2.0%
Total 70904.468 -11497.993 -16.2% 100.0%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Vulnerable products
Th e following table shows the categories of products that would be most aﬀ ected by trade deviation in case 
of EPA. Th ese products would be responsible for the lion share of the loss of Togo’s export revenues.
Fuels and petroleum products would be particularly aﬀ ected (84 per cent of the total reduction, and 
amounting to about $US 9.7 million).
While the reduction in the export of these products is by far bigger, it will be ill-advised to overlook the 
reduction in the export of other products some of which can contribute immensely to the local value-
added.
For example, exports of the ﬂ our trade industry could decline by more than $US 300 000. Drinks, 
animal fats, vegetable-fruit- and nut-based preparations as well as cotton are among the many other 
categories of products whose fall in export to the region could result in a loss of more than $US 100 000, 
a considerable loss for a small country like Togo.
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Togo: Categories of products vulnerable to the deviation of trade with ECOWAS
Chapter 
SH 2
Description Reduction in   exportsto 
ECOWAS ($US ,000)
Share in overall 
export reduction
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and products of their distillation -9762.766 84.91%
HS.11 Products of the fl our industry, malt, starch and 
inulin 
-334.388 2.91%
HS.22 Drinks, liquid alcohol and vinegar -142.338 1.24%
HS.15 Fats, animal and vegetable oil; and their 
cleavage products
-124.613 1.08%
HS.20 Vegetables, fruits and other plant preparations -123.318 1.07%
HS.52 Cotton -115.382 1.00%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
Tariﬀ  revenue loss
Customs revenues from tariﬀ s could fall by $US 35 million in Togo.
Th e following table shows the 10 categories of products (S.H.2) responsible for the highest loss of customs 
revenues.
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Togo: 10 categories of products responsible for the highest loss in customs revenues
Chapter
SH 2
Description Loss of tariff 
revenue
($US ,000)
% share in 
overall loss of 
revenue
% Cumulative 
loss
HS.87  Cars, tractors, cycles and other vehicles, etc. -9289.38 26.19% 26.19%
HS.20 Vegetables, fruits and other plant 
preparations
-3273.471 9.23% 35.42%
HS.17 Sugar and sugar confectionary -2382.141 6.72% 42.13%
HS.84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machines, 
instruments and gadgets
-2218.065 6.25% 48.39%
HS.27 Mineral fuel, oils, and products of their 
distillation 
-1871.712 5.28% 53.66%
HS.22 Drinks, liquid alcohol and vinegar -1669.443 4.71% 58.37%
HS.85 Electrical machines, instruments, materials; 
their spare parts, etc.
-1560.742 4.40% 62.77%
HS.02 Meat and other meat products -1123.276 3.17% 65.93%
HS.63  Other ready-made textile materials -1075.887 3.03% 68.97%
HS.19 Cereal-based preparations, fl our, starch 
products, milk, pastries
-907.77 2.56% 71.53%
Source: WITS-SMART simulations, ECA
In this table, there is a predominance of vehicles (chapter 87). Also, products of the agro-food industry 
seem to contribute highly to the loss of customs revenue in Togo.
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